📚 CIE Year 10 Philosophy: Core Concepts Review | CIE 十年级哲学核心知识点梳理
This revision guide outlines the fundamental ideas you will encounter in Year 10 CIE Philosophy. We will explore key questions about knowledge, reality, right and wrong, and the self, equipping you with the concepts and arguments needed to think critically and engage with philosophical texts.
本复习指南梳理了十年级 CIE 哲学课程中你将遇到的基础思想。我们将探讨关于知识、实在、对与错以及自我的关键问题，让你掌握必要的概念与论证，从而能够进行批判性思考并分析哲学原著。
1. What is Philosophy? | 什么是哲学？
Philosophy is the systematic attempt to answer fundamental questions about existence, knowledge, morality, and reason. Rather than relying on empirical science alone, it uses logical argument and conceptual analysis to clarify our thinking and challenge assumptions.
哲学是系统性地尝试回答关于存在、知识、道德和理性的根本问题。它不单独依赖经验科学，而是通过逻辑论证和概念分析来澄清我们的思考，并对预设提出质疑。
Socrates famously described philosophy as 'the unexamined life is not worth living', highlighting its commitment to critical self-reflection. In CIE Philosophy, you will learn to construct rational arguments and evaluate the views of major thinkers such as Plato, Descartes, Hume, and Kant.
苏格拉底有句名言：“未经审视的人生不值得过”，这强调了哲学对批判性自我反思的执着。在 CIE 哲学课程中，你将学习构建理性论证，并评价柏拉图、笛卡尔、休谟和康德等重要思想家的观点。
2. Knowledge and Justified True Belief | 知识与被证成的真信念
Since Plato, many philosophers have defined knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). You know that P if and only if: (1) P is true, (2) you believe that P, and (3) your belief is justified by good reasons or evidence.
自柏拉图以来，许多哲学家将知识定义为被证成的真信念（JTB）。你知道 P 当且仅当：(1) P 是真的，(2) 你相信 P，并且 (3) 你的信念有充分的理由或证据作为证成。
This tripartite definition faces famous counterexamples known as Gettier cases. In these scenarios, a person has a justified true belief but we still hesitate to say they have knowledge, because their justification relies on a lucky coincidence. This shows that the JTB definition might be insufficient.
这个三元定义面临着著名的反例，即盖梯尔案例。在这些情景中，某人拥有被证成的真信念，但我们仍然不愿说他有知识，因为他的证成依赖于一个幸运的巧合。这表明 JTB 定义可能并不充分。
In response, philosophers have added a 'no false lemmas' condition or introduced reliabilism, which ties knowledge to beliefs produced by reliable cognitive processes.
作为回应，哲学家们增加了“无假前提”条件，或引入了可靠主义，即将知识与由可靠认知过程所产生的信念联系起来。
3. The Challenge of Skepticism | 怀疑论的挑战
Skepticism questions whether we can have any knowledge at all. Global skepticism argues that because our senses can deceive us, we cannot be certain of the external world. Descartes introduced the evil demon hypothesis – a powerful deceiver who makes us believe a completely false reality.
怀疑论质疑我们是否能够拥有任何知识。全局怀疑论主张，由于我们的感官可能欺骗我们，我们无法确定外部世界的存在。笛卡尔引入了“恶魔假设”——一个强大的骗子让我们相信一个完全虚假的现实。
More recently, the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment updates this idea: if our brains were kept in a vat and fed simulated experiences, everything we believe about the world would be false. Yet our experiences would feel identical to ordinary life, making it impossible to prove we are not in a vat.
更近期的“缸中之脑”思想实验更新了这一观念：如果我们的大脑被放在缸中并被输入模拟体验，我们关于世界的一切信念都将是假的。然而，我们的体验与日常生活感受一模一样，这使我们无法证明自己不在缸中。
Descartes sought a foundation of certainty in 'I think, therefore I am' (cogito ergo sum). The fact that I am doubting proves that I exist. However, many philosophers argue that this provides a very narrow foundation that cannot by itself rebuild all our knowledge.
笛卡尔在“我思故我在”中寻找确定性的基础。我正在怀疑这一事实就证明我存在。然而，许多哲学家认为，这提供了一个非常狭窄的基础，仅凭它本身无法重建我们所有的知识。
4. Rationalism and Empiricism | 唯理论与经验论
Rationalism holds that reason is the primary source of knowledge, and that we can have innate ideas that do not depend on sensory experience. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz argued that certain truths, such as mathematics, are known a priori.
唯理论主张理性是知识的主要来源，我们可以拥有不依赖于感官经验的天赋观念。笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎和莱布尼茨论证说，某些真理，如数学，是先天可知的。
Empiricism, defended by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, claims that all knowledge arises from sense experience. The mind begins as a tabula rasa (blank slate) and is furnished with ideas through impressions. For empiricists, there are no innate ideas – even mathematical truths are either relations of ideas derived from experience or mere 'matters of fact'.
经验论由洛克、贝克莱和休谟所捍卫，主张一切知识都来源于感觉经验。心灵最初是一块“白板”，通过印象获得观念。对经验论者而言，没有天赋观念——甚至数学真理也是源自经验的观念关系或仅仅是“事实”。
A key disagreement concerns necessary truths: rationalists argue that concepts like infinity or perfection cannot be obtained from limited sensory data, whereas empiricists maintain that all complex ideas are combinations and abstractions of simple sensory impressions.
一个关键的分歧涉及必然真理：唯理论者认为，诸如无限或完美等概念不可能从有限的感官材料中获得，而经验论者则坚持所有复杂观念都只是简单感官印象的组合与抽象。
5. Ethics: Deontology vs Utilitarianism | 伦理学：义务论与功利主义
Deontological ethics, associated with Immanuel Kant, judges actions based on duty and universal moral rules, not on consequences. An action is morally right only if it can be willed as a universal law and treats persons as ends in themselves, never merely as means.
义务论伦理学与康德相关，以义务和普遍的道德法则而非后果来评判行动。一个行动在道德上是对的，仅当它能够被意愿为一条普遍法则，并且将人视为目的本身，而绝不仅仅当作手段。
Utilitarianism, developed by Bentham and Mill, is a consequentialist theory which holds that the right action is the one that maximises overall happiness or pleasure and minimises suffering. It is a cost-benefit analysis applied to well-being, often summarised as 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number'.
功利主义由边沁和密尔发展，是一种后果论理论，主张正确的行动是能够最大化总体幸福或快乐并最小化痛苦的行动。它是应用于福祉的成本收益分析，常被概括为“最大多数人的最大幸福”。
Each theory faces problems: deontology can lead to rigid rule-following even when consequences are disastrous (think of not lying to a murderer at the door), while utilitarianism may justify sacrificing an innocent person if it increases overall happiness.
每种理论都面临困难：义务论可能导致即便后果是灾难性的也要死守规则（想象一下对门口的凶手不说谎的情况），而功利主义则可能为增加总体幸福而牺牲一个无辜者来辩护。
6. Free Will and Determinism | 自由意志与决定论
Determinism claims that every event, including human choices, is causally determined by prior events and the laws of nature. If the universe is a chain of cause and effect, it seems that we cannot act freely – our 'choices' are simply the inevitable result of past states.
决定论声称，每一个事件，包括人的选择，都由在先的事件和自然法则因果决定。如果宇宙是一系列因果链条，那么我们似乎无法自由行动——我们的“选择”不过是过去状态的必然结果。
Hard determinists accept determinism and reject free will. Compatibilists (soft determinists) argue that freedom can be compatible with determinism if we define free action as doing what we desire without external coercion, even if our desires themselves are determined.
严格决定论者接受决定论并否认自由意志。相容论者（温和决定论者）主张，如果我们将自由行动定义为在没有外部强制的情况下做我们想做的事，那么自由就可以与决定论相容，即使我们的欲望本身是被决定的。
Libertarians (in the metaphysical sense) argue for genuine free will by appealing to indeterminism or agent causation. They claim we have a special capacity to initiate actions that are not fully determined by past events. The challenge for libertarians is to explain how such undetermined choices can be rational and grounded in our character.
自由意志论者（形上学意义上）通过诉诸非决定论或主体因果主张真正的自由意志。他们声称我们有特殊能力发起不被过去事件完全决定的行动。自由意志论者面临的挑战是如何解释这种未被决定的的选择能够是理性的并且基于我们的品格。
7. Personal Identity | 人格同一性
The problem of personal identity asks what makes you the same person over time, despite physical and psychological changes. John Locke proposed a psychological criterion: personal identity consists in memory continuity and psychological connectedness. You are the same person as a past self if you can remember that self's experiences.
人格同一性问题探讨的是什么让你在时间中保持同一个人，尽管存在身体和心理的变化。约翰·洛克提出了一个心理标准：人格同一性在于记忆的连续性和心理的关联性。如果你能记得过去自我的经历，你就是与过去自我同一个人。
Locke's view is challenged by the case of the prince and the cobbler, where swapping memories would mean each becomes the other person. Thomas Reid objected that memory cannot be the criterion of personal identity because we forget things, yet we do not become a different person. Moreover, memory presupposes personal identity – you have to be the same person as the one who had the experience in order to be able to remember it.
洛克的观点受到“王子与鞋匠”案例的挑战，在这个案例中，交换记忆将意味着每个人都变成了另一个人。托马斯·里德反对说，记忆不能成为人格同一性的标准，因为我们会忘记事情，但我们并不会因此变成不同的人。而且，记忆预设了人格同一性——你必须与那个拥有经历的人是同一个人，才能记得它。
Alternative theories include the biological continuity view (the brain and body are what matter) and the narrative identity approach, which sees the self as a story we construct. For Year 10, the key is to evaluate whether Lockean psychological continuity can handle common intuitions about identity.
其他的理论包括生物连续性观点（大脑和身体才是重要的）和叙事同一性进路，将自我视为我们建构的故事。对十年级而言，关键是评估洛克的心理连续性是否能够处理关于同一性的常见直觉。
8. The Problem of Induction | 归纳问题
David Hume raised a serious problem for scientific reasoning. Inductive inference draws general conclusions from specific observations: because the sun has risen every day in the past, it will rise tomorrow. But what justifies this inference? We cannot logically deduce that the future will resemble the past from the fact that it has done so in the past – that would be circular.
大卫·休谟对科学推理提出了严重的问题。归纳推理从特定的观察中得出一般性结论：因为太阳过去每天都升起，所以它明天也会升起。但什么能够证成这一推理呢？我们不能从过去一直是如此这一事实逻辑地演绎出未来也将如此——这将是循环论证。
Hume argued that our belief in the uniformity of nature is a habit of mind, not a rationally justified principle. This 'scandal of induction' remains a live issue: even if we appeal to probability, we are still using past experience to ground probability claims. Science cannot provide a non-circular justification for its own method.
休谟认为，我们对自然齐一性的信念是一种心理习惯，而非理性上被证成的原则。这个“归纳的丑闻”仍然是一个有待讨论的问题：即使我们诉诸概率，我们仍然是在用过去经验来支撑概率主张。科学无法为其自身方法提供一个非循环的证成。
Karl Popper responded by proposing falsificationism: science does not rely on induction but on the method of conjecture and refutation. A theory is scientific if it makes risky predictions that can be tested and potentially falsified. However, Popper's view also faces the pragmatic problem of how we should act without accepting the reliability of induction.
卡尔·波普尔作出回应，提出了证伪主义：科学不依赖于归纳，而是依赖于猜想与反驳的方法。一个理论如果做出可被检验且有可能被证伪的风险性预测，它就是科学的。但波普尔的观点也面临实用上的问题：若不接受归纳的可靠性，我们应如何行动。
9. Arguments for God's Existence | 上帝存在的论证
The teleological (design) argument claims that the order and complexity of the natural world points to an intelligent designer. William Paley's analogy of the watchmaker suggests that just as a watch found on the heath implies a watchmaker, the intricate structures in nature imply a divine Creator.
目的论（设计论）论证声称，自然界的秩序和复杂性指向一位智慧的设计者。威廉·佩利的钟表匠类比表明，正如在荒原上发现的一块手表意味着有一位制表匠，自然界中精密的结构也意味着一位神圣的创造者。
Hume and Darwin presented powerful criticisms. Hume questioned whether the analogy is strong enough, and whether the existence of imperfections and suffering in nature suggests a flawed designer or a team of designers. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection explains apparent design through blind variation and environmental selection, removing the need for a designer.
休谟和达尔文提出了有力的批评。休谟质疑这个类比是否足够有力，以及自然界中的不完善和苦难是否暗示了一个有缺陷的设计者或多个设计者。达尔文的自然选择进化论通过盲目变异和环境选择解释了表面的设计，从而不必再诉诸一位设计者。
The cosmological argument seeks a first cause or necessary being to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Aquinas' First Way argues that an infinite chain of causes is impossible, so there must be an uncaused first cause, which is God. Critics reply that the argument itself violates its own principle by exempting God from causation, and that modern physics questions whether the universe as a whole requires a cause.
宇宙论论证寻求一个第一因或必然存在者，以解释为什么有东西存在而不是空无一物。阿奎那的第一路论证主张，无限的因果链条是不可能的，所以必然有一个不被引发的第一因，那就是上帝。批评者回应说，该论证自身违背了其原则——将上帝豁免于因果性之外，而现代物理学质疑宇宙作为一个整体是否需要原因。
10. The Mind-Body Problem | 心身问题
The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between mental states (thoughts, feelings, qualia) and physical states (brain processes). Substance dualism, most famously defended by Descartes, claims that mind and body are two distinct substances: the mind is non-physical and can exist independently of the body.
心身问题关注的是心理状态（思想、感受、感受质）与物理状态（大脑过程）之间的关系。以笛卡尔最广为人知的实体二元论主张，心灵和身体是两种不同的实体：心灵是非物质的，可以独立于身体而存在。
Dualism faces the interaction problem: how can a non-physical mind cause physical changes in the body, and vice versa? If the mind is not located in space, it is hard to see how it can push atoms around. This challenge has led many philosophers to adopt physicalist theories.
二元论面临着互动问题：一个非物质的心灵如何能引起身体的物理变化，反之亦然？如果心灵不在空间中，便难以理解它如何能推动原子。这一挑战使得许多哲学家转向了物理主义理论。
Physicalism (or materialism) holds that mental states are identical to brain states or functional states. Eliminative materialism even suggests that 'belief' and 'desire' are folk-psychological concepts that will be replaced by neuroscience. Other options include property dualism, according to which mental properties emerge from physical processes but are not reducible to them. For CIE, focus on explaining and evaluating the interaction problem for dualism.
物理主义（或唯物主义）主张，心理状态等同于大脑状态或功能状态。取消式唯物主义甚至提出，“信念”和“欲望”这些民间心理学概念将被神经科学取代。其他选择包括属性二元论，认为心理属性从物理过程中涌现但不可还原为物理属性。对 CIE 而言，重点在于解释和评价二元论的互动问题。
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