📚 Informal Sources of Presidential Power and Their Use | 美国总统非正式权力的来源与运用
The formal powers of the US president, as enumerated in Article II of the Constitution, are surprisingly brief. The chief executive commands the armed forces, makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints ambassadors and judges, and must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed". Yet the modern presidency far exceeds these sparse grants. This expansion is largely driven by informal sources of power – methods, practices, and institutional advantages that have evolved over time, often beyond the clear text of the Constitution. Understanding these informal sources is essential for any student of US government, as they shape the true balance of power in Washington. This article examines the key informal sources of presidential power and analyses how successive presidents have employed them to pursue their political and policy objectives.
依据美国宪法第二条所列举的总统正式权力出奇地简短。国家元首统帅军队，经参议院建议和同意缔结条约，任命大使和法官，并必须“注意使法律忠实执行”。然而，现代总统的权力远远超出了这些稀少的授权。这种扩张主要由非正式权力来源驱动——那些随着时间的推移而演变的方法、实践与制度优势，往往超出了宪法的明确规定。理解这些非正式来源对于任何学习美国政府的学生都至关重要，因为它们塑造了华盛顿真正的权力平衡。本文审视了总统非正式权力的关键来源，并分析历任总统如何运用它们来实现其政治与政策目标。
1. The Bully Pulpit and Direct Appeals to the Public | 白宫讲坛与向公众直接呼吁
Theodore Roosevelt coined the term "bully pulpit" – a platform from which the president can preach to and shape public opinion. The informal power of the bully pulpit lies not in any constitutional clause but in the president’s unique ability to command national attention. Through televised addresses, press conferences, social media, and public appearances, the president can frame issues, set the national agenda, and pressure Congress by mobilising public sentiment. For example, Ronald Reagan used prime-time speeches to generate support for his tax cuts in 1981, effectively compelling a Democratic House to pass his economic programme. Barack Obama similarly employed televised addresses and ‘Twitter town halls’ to rally young voters behind the Affordable Care Act. The bully pulpit transforms the president from a mere legislative petitioner into an active opinion leader.
西奥多·罗斯福创造了“白宫讲坛”一词——一个总统能够向公众宣扬并塑造民意的高台。白宫讲坛的非正式力量不源于任何宪法条款，而在于总统吸引全国关注的独特能力。通过电视讲话、新闻发布会、社交媒体和公开露面，总统能够框定议题、设定国家议程，并通过动员公众情绪来向国会施压。例如，罗纳德·里根在1981年利用黄金时段演讲为其减税计划争取支持，有效地迫使民主党控制的众议院通过了他的经济方案。巴拉克·奥巴马同样利用电视讲话和“推特市政厅”来鼓动年轻选民支持《平价医疗法案》。白宫讲坛将总统从一个单纯的立法请愿者转变为积极的舆论领袖。
2. Executive Orders and Presidential Directives | 行政命令与总统指令
Executive orders are not mentioned in the Constitution, yet they have become a primary tool for presidents to direct the operations of the federal government. Issued under the implied authority of Article II, executive orders allow the president to instruct executive branch agencies on how to implement laws, often with the force of law. While they cannot contradict existing statutes, they can shape policy significantly in areas where Congress has been vague or inactive. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 led to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. More recently, Barack Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programme was created via executive order after Congress failed to pass immigration reform. Donald Trump famously issued a flurry of orders on his first days in office, reversing Obama-era regulations. Executive orders exemplify how presidents can bypass a gridlocked Congress and generate immediate policy outcomes.
行政命令在宪法中并未提及，但它们已成为总统指导联邦政府运作的主要工具。根据第二条的默示权力签发的行政命令，允许总统指示行政分支诸机构如何执行法律，通常具有法律效力。虽然它们不能与现有成文法相冲突，但在国会规定模糊或不作为的领域，它们能显著塑造政策。富兰克林·D·罗斯福的第9066号行政命令引发了二战期间对日裔美国人的拘禁。更近期的，巴拉克·奥巴马的《童年来美暂缓遣返》（DACA）计划便是在国会未能通过移民改革后通过行政命令创设的。唐纳德·特朗普上任第一天就签发了一系列命令，逆转了奥巴马时代的法规，此事声名在外。行政命令体现了总统如何绕过一个陷入僵局的国会并产生即时的政策结果。
3. Executive Agreements and Foreign Policy | 行政协议与外交政策
The Constitution grants the president the power to make treaties "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur". However, a treaty is often a slow and politically risky instrument. To circumvent the supermajority requirement, modern presidents increasingly rely on executive agreements – political commitments made between the president and a foreign leader without Senate ratification. While they are not mentioned in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has upheld their validity in cases such as US v. Pink (1942). The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was originally negotiated as a trade pact and implemented through congressional-executive agreement, yet many purely bilateral pacts have been conducted solely as executive agreements. The Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015 was concluded by the Obama administration as a political commitment rather than a treaty, making it easier for a successor to withdraw – as Donald Trump did in 2018. This source of power allows presidents to act swiftly in international affairs but raises questions about permanence and congressional oversight.
宪法赋予总统经参议院“建议和同意”缔结条约的权力，“须有出席参议员三分之二赞成”。然而，条约通常是一种缓慢且具有政治风险的工具。为绕开绝对多数的要求，现代总统越来越依赖行政协议——总统与外国领导人之间无需参议院批准的政洽承诺。虽然宪法未提及行政协议，但最高法院在诸如美国诉平克案（1942年）中认可了其有效性。《北美自由贸易协定》最初是作为一项贸易协定谈判并以国会-行政协议形式实施的，然而许多纯粹的双边协约仅以行政协议的形式进行。2015年的《伊核协议》由奥巴马政府作为政治承诺缔结，而非条约，这使得后任者更容易退出——就如同唐纳德·特朗普在2018年所做的那样。这种权力来源使总统能在国际事务中迅速行动，但也引发了持久性和国会监督方面的问题。
4. Signing Statements and Legislative Interpretation | 签署声明与立法解释
A signing statement is a written pronouncement issued by the president upon signing a bill into law. This informal power has grown from a ceremonial gesture into a tool for shaping how laws are interpreted and enforced. Presidents can use signing statements to declare that certain provisions are unconstitutional or that they will execute the law according to their own interpretation, effectively reserving the power to ignore parts of a statute. George W. Bush famously attached a signing statement to the McCain Detainee Treatment Act, asserting his authority as Commander-in-Chief to bypass statutory restrictions on interrogation techniques. Barack Obama and Donald Trump both continued the practice, albeit with varying justification. While critics argue signing statements amount to an unconstitutional line-item veto, the courts have rarely constrained them, making this a potent informal weapon in the presidential arsenal.
签署声明是总统在签署法案使其成为法律时发布的书面宣告。这一非正式权力已从一种仪式性示意成长为塑造法律解释与执行方式的工具。总统可利用签署声明宣称某些条款违宪，或者他们将按照自己的解释执行法律，这实际上保留了无视成文法部分内容的权力。乔治·W·布什曾对《麦凯恩囚犯待遇法案》附加了一份著名的签署声明，声称作为总司令他有权绕过法案对审讯技术的限制。巴拉克·奥巴马和唐纳德·特朗普都延续了这一做法，尽管各自的证成各异。虽然批评者认为签署声明等同于违宪的单项否决，但法院极少限制它们，这使之成为总统武器库中一件强有力的非正式武器。
5. Executive Privilege and the Withholding of Information | 行政特权与信息保密
Executive privilege is the implied power of the president to resist certain subpoenas and other interventions by the legislative and judicial branches to access information or personnel relating to executive branch communications. While not explicitly stated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court recognized it in United States v. Nixon (1974) as inherent in the separation of powers, though not absolute. Presidents invoke executive privilege to protect sensitive military or diplomatic secrets and to preserve candid internal deliberations. Dwight Eisenhower used it over 40 times, and Richard Nixon attempted to use it to avoid releasing the Watergate tapes – a claim the Court rejected. More recently, Barack Obama invoked a limited form during the Fast and Furious gun-running investigation. This power shields the executive from intrusive oversight but can also shield wrongdoing, provoking intense institutional battles between the branches.
行政特权是总统的一项默示权力，用以抵御立法与司法分支发出的某些传票及其它获取与行政分支通讯相关之信息或人员的干预。虽然宪法中没有明文规定，最高法院在合众国诉尼克松案（1974年）中认可其为权力分立所固有，尽管并非绝对。总统援引行政特权来保护敏感的军事或外交机密，并维护坦诚的内部商议。德怀特·艾森豪威尔曾使用该特权逾40次，理查德·尼克松试图用它来避免公布水门事件录音带——法院驳回了这一主张。更近期的，巴拉克·奥巴马在“速度与激情”枪支走私行动调查期间援引了有限形式的特权。这种权力屏蔽了行政分支免受侵扰性监督，但也可能庇护不法行为，从而激起分支间激烈的制度性斗争。
6. The Power to Persuade and Neustadt’s Bargaining Framework | 说服之权力与诺伊施塔特的讨价还价框架
In his seminal 1960 work Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt argued that the president’s primary power is "the power to persuade". By this, Neustadt meant the ability to negotiate, bargain, and convince other political actors – members of Congress, bureaucrats, interest groups, and foreign leaders – to do what the president wants. This informal power relies on the president’s professional reputation, public prestige, and strategic use of both carrots and sticks. Lyndon B. Johnson was a master of the "Johnson Treatment", famously cajoling, threatening, and flattering senators in close quarters to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A president high in the polls can leverage their popularity to win legislative votes; a weakened president finds it harder to persuade. Thus, the power to persuade is fluid and hinges on the individual president’s personal skills and political capital at any given moment.
理查德·诺伊施塔特在其1960年的开创性著作《总统权力》中主张，总统的首要权力是“说服的权力”。诺伊施塔特意指的是谈判、讨价还价并说服其他政治行动者——国会议员、官僚、利益集团及外国领导人——按总统所愿行事的能耐。这种非正式权力依赖于总统的职业声誉、公众声望以及对胡萝卜与大棒的战略运用。林登·B·约翰逊是“约翰逊手法”的大师，他曾在近距离内哄骗、威胁并奉承参议员们，以通过1964年的《民权法案》，这一事迹颇为著名。民调中支持率高的总统可以凭借其声望赢得立法投票；一个弱化了的总统则更难说服。因此，说服的权力是流动的，并取决于个别总统的个人技巧和在任一时刻的政治资本。
7. Party Leadership and the Mandate Claim | 政党领导权与民意授权主张
Nowhere does the Constitution designate the president as the head of a political party. In practice, however, the president assumes this role as the de facto leader of their party. As party leader, the president campaigns for congressional and senatorial candidates, helps shape the party platform, and dispenses patronage and endorsements. A president who has just won a decisive election often claims an electoral "mandate" – an implied endorsement of their policy agenda by the electorate. This informal mandate is invoked to push through legislative programmes, as Franklin D. Roosevelt did in 1933 with the New Deal. The mandate claim can be a powerful rhetorical device to discipline party members and sway moderate opponents. Its efficacy, however, depends on the perceived legitimacy of the election outcome and the president’s coattails in down-ballot races.
宪法未曾规定总统担任任何政党的领袖。但在实践中，总统扮演着本党实际领袖的角色。作为政党领袖，总统为国会和参议院候选人助选，帮助塑造党纲，并分发政治恩惠与背书。一个刚赢得决定性选举的总统常常宣称获得了选举“授权”——即选民对其政策议程的隐含认可。这种非正式的授权主张被援引来推动立法计划，正如富兰克林·D·罗斯福在1933年推行“新政”时那般。授权主张可以成为一种强有力的修辞工具，借以整肃党员并动摇温和的反对者。然而，其效力取决于选举结果的公认合法性以及总统在选区以下级别竞选中的“挂尾效应”。
8. Crisis Management and the "Prerogative" Power | 危机管理与“特权”权力
In times of national emergency, presidents frequently claim extraordinary powers to respond swiftly and decisively. John Locke first theorised such a "prerogative" – the power to act according to discretion for the public good without the prescription of the law. Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War without congressional approval. After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush asserted broad authority to conduct surveillance and detain enemy combatants, arguing that the Commander-in-Chief clause and the AUMF collectively granted him implicit war powers exceeding statutory limits. Courts often defer to the executive during genuine emergencies, but the danger of this informal source is that presidents may exploit crises to permanently expand their power. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 attempted to codify and constrain this power, yet dozens of declared national emergencies remain in effect, allowing presidents to tap into a reservoir of activated authorities.
在国家非常时期，总统常常主张拥有超乎寻常的权力以迅速、果断地应对。约翰·洛克率先阐述了这样一种“特权”——即出于公共福祉，在不依法律明文规定的情况下，依自由裁量行事的权力。亚伯拉罕·林肯在美国内战期间未经国会批准中止了人身保护令。在9/11袭击之后，乔治·W·布什声称拥有广泛的权力进行监控并拘留敌方战斗人员，主张总司令条款与《授权使用军事力量决议》共同授予了他超越成文法限制的隐含战争权力。法院在真正的紧急状态下往往遵从行政分支，但这种非正式来源的危险在于，总统可能利用危机来永久性地扩大其权力。1976年的《国家紧急状态法》试图将此项权力入典并予以限制，然而数十项已宣布的国家紧急状态至今仍然有效，使得总统能够动用一整套已激活的权力储备。
9. Media, Social Media, and Agenda Setting | 媒体、社交媒体与议程设置
While the traditional bully pulpit relied on radio and television, the digital age has given presidents direct access to citizens through social media platforms. This informal power allows a president to bypass traditional media gatekeepers, shape the news cycle, and mobilise supporters instantaneously. Donald Trump’s prolific use of Twitter exemplified the potential and the pitfalls of this tool: he could announce policy shifts, attack opponents, and signal priorities to executive agencies with a single tweet. Barack Obama’s team used YouTube and Facebook to create a more carefully curated image of leadership. The ability to frame an issue early and repeat a message relentlessly creates a powerful agenda-setting function, which in turn pressures Congress and the bureaucracy to respond. Such influence, however, is double-edged; unfiltered tweets can damage credibility and lead to misunderstandings both domestically and internationally.
传统的白宫讲坛依赖广播和电视，而数字时代则赋予了总统通过社交媒体直接触达公民的途径。这一非正式权力允许总统绕开传统媒体守门人，塑造新闻周期，并即时动员支持者。唐纳德·特朗普对推特的频繁使用彰显了这一工具的潜力与陷阱：他可以凭一条推文宣布政策转变，攻击反对者，并向行政机构发出优先事项信号。巴拉克·奥巴马的团队利用YouTube和Facebook打造了一种更为精心策划的领导形象。能够及早框定议题并不断重复讯息，创造出一种强大的议程设置功能，进而逼迫国会和官僚机构做出回应。然而，此类影响亦是双刃剑；未经过滤的推文可能损害公信力，并在国内外引发误解。
10. The Role of the White House Staff and the Institutional Presidency | 白宫幕僚的角色与制度化的总统权
The modern presidency is not merely an individual office but an institution comprising thousands of staff, councils, and advisory bodies. The growth of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) since 1939 has created a vast informal apparatus that wields power on the president's behalf. White House staff, unlike cabinet secretaries, do not require Senate confirmation and are hired and fired at the president’s pleasure. They shape the flow of information, coordinate policy development, and manage congressional relations. A chief of staff like James Baker under Ronald Reagan can be as powerful as a cabinet member, while national security advisors often overshadow secretaries of state. The reliance on staff enhances presidential control over the executive branch but also insulates the president from accountability, reinforcing what some scholars call the "unitary executive" theory in practice, albeit informally constructed.
现代总统职位不仅仅是一个个人办公室，而是一个由数千名幕僚、委员会和顾问机构组成的制度体系。自1939年以来，白宫办公厅及其执行机构的扩张创建了一个庞大的、以总统名义行使权力的非正式工具。与内阁部长不同，白宫幕僚无需参议院确认，只听命由总统聘用或解雇。他们塑造信息流动，协调政策制定，并管理国会关系。如罗纳德·里根时期的幕僚长詹姆斯·贝克，其权势可堪内阁成员，而国家安全顾问往往让国务卿黯然失色。对幕僚的依赖增强了总统对行政分支的控制，但也使得总统免受追责，这在实践中强化了一些学者所谓的“一元行政论”，尽管是以非正式的方式建构起来的。
11. Informal Use of the Veto and Budgetary Power | 否决权与预算权力的非正式运用
The Constitution gives the president a qualified veto over legislation. However, the mere threat of a veto – an informal power – can reshape legislative behaviour without the president ever lifting a pen. A credible veto threat forces Congress to negotiate changes early, preserving presidential priorities. Additionally, the president’s central role in the annual budget process, formalised after 1921, gives the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) enormous influence over agency spending and policy direction. Through impoundment – refusing to spend appropriated funds – presidents from Thomas Jefferson onward sought to control expenditures, until the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 limited the practice. Even so, OMB continues to shape the administrative state through regulatory review, quietly killing or modifying rules proposed by executive agencies. These budgetary and regulatory levers, while often technical, constitute a deep and sustained source of informal influence.
宪法赋予了总统对立法有限的否决权。然而，仅仅是否决的威胁——一种非正式权力——就能在总统不曾提笔的情况下重塑立法行为。一个可信的否决威胁迫使国会及早进行谈判修改，遂以维护总统之优先事项。此外，总统在年度预算制定过程中的核心角色——1921年后被正式化——赋予了行政管理和预算局对机构开支及政策方向巨大的影响力。通过截留——即拒绝支出已拨付的资金——自托马斯·杰斐逊以来的历任总统皆试图控制开支，直至1974年《国会预算与截留控制法》限制了这一做法。即便如此，行政管理和预算局仍然通过行政规则审核悄悄地塑造着行政国家，扼杀或修改由执行机构拟议的规章。这些预算和规制杠杆虽然常为技术性的，却构成了一种深厚而持续的非正式影响之源。
12. Limits on Informal Powers and the Resilience of Checks and Balances | 非正式权力的限制与制衡机制的韧性
Despite the expansive growth of informal presidential powers, they are not unlimited. Public opinion can quickly turn, neutering the bully pulpit. Congress retains the power of the purse and can investigate alleged executive overreach. The Supreme Court, as in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), has checked presidents who claim sweeping inherent authority without statutory backing. Informal sources of power often depend on a president’s personal credibility, political capital, and the external environment; a divided government and low approval ratings dramatically reduce their effectiveness. Moreover, the next administration can reverse executive actions, highlighting the impermanence of unilateral tools. Thus, while the informal presidency has transformed the office, it remains embedded within a constitutional system that – albeit sometimes sluggish – still provides significant friction against unbounded executive action.
尽管非正式总统权力已大幅扩张，它们并非毫无边际。公众舆论能够迅速转向，使白宫讲坛失效。国会保有财政大权，并能够调查涉嫌的行政越权。最高法院，如同在“扬斯顿薄板管材公司诉索耶案”（1952年）中一样，已遏制过那些声称拥有广泛固有权力却无法定依据的总统。非正式权力来源往往依赖于总统的个人可信度、政治资本及外部环境；一个分立政府与低迷的民调支持率会大大降低其效力。而且，下任政府可以反转前一届的行政行动，这凸显了单边工具的非永久性。因此，尽管非正式总统权已改变了这一职位，它仍然深嵌于一个宪法体系之中——该体系尽管有时迟缓，却仍然对不受约束的行政行动构成显著的摩擦。
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