📚 Wage Determination in Imperfect Markets | 不完全市场中的工资决定
In perfectly competitive labour markets, wages are determined by the interaction of supply and demand. However, real-world labour markets often exhibit imperfections such as monopsony power, trade unions, and information asymmetries. This article explores how wages are set under these imperfect conditions, examining key models and their implications for employment and equity.
在完全竞争的劳动力市场中，工资由供给与需求的相互作用决定。然而，现实世界中的劳动力市场常常存在不完全性，例如买方垄断力量、工会和信息不对称。本文探讨在不完全条件下工资如何决定，并分析关键模型及其对就业与公平的影响。
1. Understanding Imperfect Labour Markets | 理解不完全劳动力市场
In a perfectly competitive labour market, both firms and workers are wage takers, and the wage equals the marginal revenue product of labour (MRP). However, many labour markets deviate from this ideal due to factors such as a single dominant employer, collective bargaining, government intervention, or labour immobility.
在完全竞争的劳动力市场中，企业和工人都是工资接受者，工资等于劳动的边际收入产品（MRP）。然而，由于单一主导雇主、集体谈判、政府干预或劳动力不流动等因素，许多劳动力市场偏离了这一理想状态。
Imperfections lead to wages that may be above or below the competitive equilibrium, and employment levels may not be efficient. The main types of imperfections include monopsony, trade union influence, bilateral monopoly, and efficiency wage considerations.
不完全性导致工资可能高于或低于竞争均衡，就业水平可能无效率。主要的不完全类型包括买方垄断、工会影响、双边垄断和效率工资考量。
2. The Monopsony Model | 买方垄断模型
A monopsony is a market with a single buyer of labour. The monopsonist faces an upward-sloping labour supply curve, meaning to hire additional workers, it must raise the wage not only for new hires but also for all existing workers. This makes the marginal cost of labour (MFC) greater than the average cost of labour (wage).
买方垄断是只有一个劳动力购买者的市场。垄断买方面对向上倾斜的劳动力供给曲线，这意味着要雇用更多工人，不仅必须提高新雇员的工资，还要提高所有现有工人的工资。这使得劳动力的边际成本（MFC）高于平均劳动力成本（工资）。
The profit-maximising monopsonist hires labour where MRP equals MFC, not where MRP equals the wage. It then pays the wage determined by the labour supply curve at that employment level. This results in lower employment and lower wages compared to a competitive market.
利润最大化的垄断买方在MRP等于MFC处雇用劳动，而不是在MRP等于工资处。然后根据该就业水平下劳动力供给曲线所决定的工资进行支付。结果，与竞争性市场相比，就业水平更低，工资也更低。
MRP = MFC (not MRP = W)
The difference between the MRP and the wage represents monopsonistic exploitation. Workers are paid less than their contribution to the firm's revenue.
MRP与工资之间的差额代表买方垄断剥削。工人获得的报酬低于其对企业收入的贡献。
Real-world examples of monopsony power include a single large factory in a small town, or a specialised hospital as the main employer of nurses.
现实中买方垄断力量的例子包括小镇上唯一的大型工厂，或是作为护士主要雇主的专科医院。
3. Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining | 工会与集体谈判
Trade unions aim to improve wages and working conditions for their members. In an imperfect labour market, a union can act as a monopolist supplier of labour, negotiating wages above the competitive equilibrium. This creates a wage-setting power that counteracts employer monopsony.
工会旨在改善其成员的工资和工作条件。在不完全劳动力市场中，工会可以充当劳动力的垄断供应者，通过谈判将工资定在竞争均衡之上。这形成了工资设定的力量，抵消了雇主的买方垄断。
Unions can raise wages through restricting labour supply (e.g., closed shops), bargaining for higher wages directly, or supporting productivity improvements. The impact on employment depends on the elasticity of labour demand. If demand is inelastic, the employment loss from higher wages is small.
工会可以通过限制劳动力供给（例如封闭式企业）、直接谈判提高工资或支持生产率提升来提高工资。对就业的影响取决于劳动力需求弹性。如果需求缺乏弹性，高工资带来的就业损失较小。
In a monopsonistic market, a union may actually increase both wages and employment, because the monopsonist was previously suppressing wages below MRP. By setting a higher, uniform wage, the union removes the need for the monopsonist to raise all wages when hiring additional workers, thus lowering MFC and encouraging hiring up to the competitive level.
在买方垄断市场中，工会实际上可能同时提高工资和就业，因为垄断买方先前将工资压低到MRP以下。工会通过设定更高的统一工资，消除了垄断买方在雇用额外工人时提高所有工资的必要性，从而降低了MFC，激励就业达到竞争水平。
4. Bilateral Monopoly | 双边垄断
Bilateral monopoly occurs when a monopsonist employer faces a trade union with monopoly power over labour supply. The wage outcome is indeterminate in theory and depends on the relative bargaining strength of both sides.
双边垄断发生在买方垄断雇主面对一个对劳动力供给具有垄断力量的工会时。工资结果在理论上是不确定的，取决于双方的相对谈判实力。
union pushes for a higher wage, possibly up to the level where the marginal revenue product equals the union' e two limits, depending on factors such as strike power, public opinion, and elasticity of demand.
雇主力求支付买方垄断工资（MFC = MRP），而工会推进更高工资，可能直至边际收入产品等于工会供给曲线的水平。最终谈判工资将位于这两个极限之间，取决于罢工力量、公众舆论和需求弹性等因素。
This model helps explain why wages in heavily unionised sectors (e.g., railways, public services) are often higher than in less organised sectors, even when employers are powerful.
这一模型有助于解释为什么在工会化程度高的部门（如铁路、公共服务），即使雇主力量很大，工资也往往高于组织程度较低的部门。
5. Efficiency Wage Theory | 效率工资理论
Efficiency wage theory suggests that firms may pay wages above the market-clearing level to increase worker productivity. This is a form of labour market imperfection arising from asymmetric information and principal-agent problems.
效率工资理论认为，企业可能支付高于市场出清水平的工资以提高工人生产率。这是由信息不对称和委托-代理问题引起的一种劳动力市场不完全性。
Higher wages can reduce shirking, lower turnover, attract higher-quality applicants, and improve morale. The 'no-shirking' condition implies that workers are more productive when they fear losing a well-paying job.
更高的工资可以减少怠工、降低人员流动、吸引更高质量的申请者并提高士气。“不偷懒”条件意味着当工人担心失去高薪工作时，生产率会更高。
As a result, the firm's labour demand curve may shift, and it may find it optimal to pay a wage where MRP > MFC in the conventional sense, but where the wage maximises profit by lowering unit labour costs. This can lead to persistent unemployment because wages are held above equilibrium.
因此，企业的劳动力需求曲线可能移动，企业可能发现支付一个传统意义上MRP > MFC的工资是最优的，但此时工资通过降低单位劳动成本实现利润最大化。这可能导致持续失业，因为工资维持在均衡水平之上。
6. Discrimination in Labour Markets | 劳动力市场中的歧视
Discrimination introduces another imperfection. Employer discrimination (taste-based) or statistical discrimination can result in some groups being paid lower wages or facing limited job opportunities despite having the same productivity as others.
歧视引入了另一种不完全性。雇主歧视（基于偏好）或统计歧视可能导致某些群体尽管与其他群体生产率相同，却获得较低工资或面临有限的就业机会。
In a perfectly competitive market, discrimination should be competed away, but in imperfect markets with monopsony or limited competition, discriminatory wage gaps can persist. Workers cannot easily move to non-discriminating employers if job alternatives are scarce.
在完全竞争市场中，歧视应该会被竞争消除，但在具有买方垄断或有限竞争的不完全市场中，歧视性工资差距可能持续存在。如果工作选择稀少，工人无法轻易流向无歧视的雇主。
Discrimination creates a misallocation of labour and contributes to income inequality. Policies such as equal pay legislation and affirmative action aim to correct these market failures.
歧视导致劳动力配置不当并加剧收入不平等。同工同酬立法和扶持行动等政策旨在纠正这些市场失灵。
7. Minimum Wage Legislation in Imperfect Markets | 不完全市场中的最低工资立法
In a competitive labour market, a minimum wage above equilibrium causes excess supply (unemployment). However, in a monopsony, a well-set minimum wage can increase both wages and employment. This is because it acts as a constraint that prevents the monopsonist from exploiting its wage-setting power.
在竞争性劳动力市场中，高于均衡的最低工资会导致超额供给（失业）。然而，在买方垄断中，设定适当的最低工资可以同时提高工资和就业。这是因为它充当了一个约束，阻止了垄断买方利用其工资设定权力。
here the supply curve rises above it. The firm then hires where MRP = minimum wage, leading to higher employment.
如果最低工资设定在买方垄断工资与竞争性工资之间，则MFC变为常数且等于最低工资，直到供给曲线超过最低工资的点。然后企业雇用至MRP等于最低工资，导致就业上升。
Before: MFC > W; After: MFC = Wmin (constant)
This is a key argument for the effectiveness of minimum wages in low-wage monopsonistic markets, such as some local labour markets or gig economy platforms.
这是支持在低工资买方垄断市场（例如一些地方劳动力市场或零工经济平台）中最低工资有效性的关键论据。
8. The Role of Imperfect Information | 信息不完全的作用
Imperfect information affects both workers and employers. Workers may not know about higher-paying jobs elsewhere, and employers may lack perfect knowledge of worker productivity. This can lead to wage dispersion for similar jobs and persistent unemployment.
信息不完全影响工人和雇主双方。工人可能不知道别处有高薪工作，雇主可能不完全了解工人的生产率。这会导致类似工作的工资分布分散和持续失业。
Search theory models suggest that workers and firms engage in a matching process. Wages are determined not just by MRP but also by the bargaining process, influenced by the 'outside options' of both parties. The result is a wage range rather than a single market-clearing wage.
搜索理论模型表明，工人和企业参与匹配过程。工资不仅由MRP决定，还受双方“外部选择”影响的谈判过程所决定。其结果是形成一个工资范围而非单一的市场出清工资。
Government job centres and digital platforms aim to reduce information failures, making labour markets function more efficiently.
政府就业中心和数字平台旨在减少信息失灵，使劳动力市场运作更有效率。
9. Evaluation of Wage Determination in Imperfect Markets | 不完全市场工资决定的评估
When evaluating imperfect labour markets, it is important to consider the welfare implications. Monopsony leads to a deadweight loss due to under-employment and exploitation. Unionisation may restore efficiency but can also create wage rigidities that cause unemployment during recessions.
在评估不完全劳动力市场时，考虑福利影响很重要。买方垄断导致由于就业不足和剥削而产生的无谓损失。工会化可能恢复效率，但也可能造成工资刚性，在经济衰退时导致失业。
The efficiency of a bilateral monopoly outcome depends on bargaining power; it can be closer to the competitive outcome if both sides are equally strong. Efficiency wages can improve productivity but might reduce aggregate employment if many firms adopt them.
双边垄断结果的效率取决于谈判力量；如果双方实力相当，可能更接近竞争结果。效率工资可以提高生产率，但如果许多企业采用，可能减少总就业。
Policies like minimum wages need careful calibration: too low has no effect, too high may cause unemployment even in a monopsony. Overall, there is no single 'best' model—the appropriate framework depends on the specific market structure and institutional context.
最低工资等政策需要仔细校准：太低没有效果，太高即使在买方垄断中也可能导致失业。总体而言，没有单一的“最佳”模型——适当的框架取决于具体的市场结构和制度环境。
10. Conclusion | 结论
Wage determination in imperfect markets deviates significantly from the competitive ideal. Monopsony power, trade unions, efficiency wages, discrimination, and government intervention all shape real-world wages. Understanding these models allows economists to better analyse labour market outcomes and design effective policies to improve equity and efficiency.
不完全市场中的工资决定显著偏离了竞争理想。买方垄断力量、工会、效率工资、歧视和政府干预都塑造了现实世界的工资。理解这些模型使经济学家能够更好地分析劳动力市场结果，并设计有效的政策以改善公平与效率。
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