📚 A-Level Eduqas Philosophy: Terminology Quick-Memorisation Guide | A-Level Eduqas 哲学：词汇术语速记指南
Mastering philosophical terminology is half the battle in A-Level Eduqas Philosophy. This guide breaks down high-frequency terms into bite-sized definitions, paired with memory hooks and cross-references to major themes in epistemology, ethics, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Use it alongside your specification map to cement your conceptual precision and exam confidence.
掌握哲学术语是 A-Level Eduqas 哲学考试成功的一半。本指南将高频术语分解为易记的定义，配以记忆钩子和与认识论、伦理学、形而上学及心灵哲学等主要主题的交叉引用。结合你的考纲使用，可巩固概念精确度并提升应试信心。
1. Epistemology: Core Concepts | 认识论：核心概念
Epistemology asks 'What is knowledge?' The tripartite definition – justified true belief (JTB) – is the starting point, but Gettier cases expose its fragility. Embed these distinctions early: knowledge by acquaintance vs propositional knowledge, and the difference between a priori and a posteriori justification. When you see 'JTB+', think of the No False Lemmas response.
认识论追问“什么是知识？”三要素定义——确证的真信念（JTB）——是起点，但盖梯尔案例揭示了其脆弱性。尽早嵌入这些区分：亲知知识与命题知识，以及先天与后天确证的差异。当你看到“JTB+”时，想到无错误前提（No False Lemmas）的回应。
- Propositional Knowledge: 'knowing that' – the knowledge expressed in declarative sentences. Memory hook: 'Proposition knows-that, can be true or false flat.'
- 命题知识: “知道什么”——以陈述句表达的知识。记忆钩子：“命题知真假，陈述把它发。”
- Acquaintance Knowledge: 'knowing of' – direct experiential familiarity. Think 'Acquaintance = I met the queen, not just facts about her.'
- 亲知知识: “认识”——直接的经验熟悉。联想：“亲知如见女王，不只听说一场。”
- A Priori: justification independent of sensory experience (e.g. 2+2=4). Mnemonic: 'A priori = prior to experience, pure reason's appliance.'
- 先天: 不依赖于感官经验的确证（如2+2=4）。助记：“先天在先，理性独演。”
- A Posteriori: justification dependent on experience. 'A posteriori = post-experience story.'
- 后天: 依赖于经验的确证。助记：“后天靠经验，事实来检验。”
| Term | Gettier Case Glitch |
|---|---|
| JTB | Belief + Truth + Justification can fail when luck replaces connection. |
| 术语 | 盖梯尔问题：信念+真+确证仍可能因运气而非真正的认知联系而失败。 |
2. The Tripartite View & Its Defenders | 三要素论及其辩护者
The classic account hails from Plato's Theaetetus. For Eduqas, you must distinguish internalist and externalist additions. Infaliibilism demands absolute certainty; reliabilism says a belief is justified if produced by a reliable process. Use the clock example: a stopped clock that coincidentally shows the right time – you have a true belief, but is it knowledge? No, because the process is unreliable. That's reliabilism in action.
经典论述源自柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》。对Eduqas考试，你必须区分内在主义与外在主义的补充。不可错论要求绝对确定性；可靠论说如果信念由一个可靠的认知过程产生，它就是确证的。使用停摆的时钟例子：一个碰巧显示正确时间的坏钟——你有真信念，但这是知识吗？不，因为过程不可靠。这就是可靠论的实际应用。
- Infallibilism: knowledge requires justification that guarantees truth. Memory: 'Infallible leaves no room for a mistake nibble.'
- 不可错论: 知识要求确证能保证真理。助记：“不可错，真理锁，容不得一点差错。”
- Reliabilism: a belief is justified if formed by a reliable cognitive mechanism. 'Reliable process = reliable knowledge access.'
- 可靠论: 若信念由可靠的认知机制形成，则是确证的。助记：“过程可靠，知识才牢靠。”
- No False Lemmas: JTB+ condition – the justification must not rely on any false intermediate belief. Mnemonic: 'No false lemma, no rotten stemma.'
- 无错误前提: JTB+条件——确证不能依赖任何虚假的中间信念。助记：“无假前提，推理不斜。”
3. Direct & Indirect Realism | 直接实在论与间接实在论
Do we perceive the world directly or via sense-data? Direct realism says the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent physical objects. The argument from illusion challenges this: a bent stick in water suggests we perceive sense-data, not the stick itself. Indirect realism accepts sense-data as intermediaries and then must bridge the veil of perception. Remember Russell's table: touch and sight give different sense-data, yet we postulate one underlying object.
我们是直接感知世界还是通过感觉材料？直接实在论声称知觉的直接对象是独立于心灵的外部物体。错觉论证对此提出挑战：水中弯曲的棍子表明我们感知到的是感觉材料，而非棍子本身。间接实在论接受感觉材料作为中介，然后必须解决“知觉之幕”的问题。记住罗素的桌子：触觉和视觉给出不同的感觉材料，但我们假定有一个背后物体。
- Sense-Data: the contents of perceptual experience (colours, shapes) that we are directly aware of. 'Sense-data stream, the mental dream.'
- 感觉材料: 我们直接意识到的知觉经验内容（颜色、形状）。助记：“感觉材料是知觉流，心中影像脑中留。”
- Veil of Perception: the epistemic gap between sense-data and the external world. Hook: 'Veil makes us ask "What's real beyond the feel?"'
- 知觉之幕: 感觉材料与外部世界之间的认识间隙。联想：“幕布遮眼，世界难见真面。”
- Naïve Realism: another name for direct realism, implying an innocent, intuitive view. 'Naïve says seeing is believing, no deceiving.'
- 朴素实在论: 直接实在论的别称，暗示一种天真、直观的看法。助记：“朴素直言，见即信然。”
4. The Existence of God: Key Conceptual Toolkit | 上帝存在：关键概念工具包
Eduqas metaphysics of God covers ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments, plus the problem of evil. Master the vocabulary of necessity, contingency, and the attributes of God (omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence). The Kalam cosmological argument uses 'actual infinity' and 'temporal regress' – vocabulary you must wield precisely. For theodicies, distinguish 'greater good' from 'soul-making'.
Eduqas上帝形而上学涵盖本体论、宇宙论和目的论论证，以及恶的问题。掌握必然性、偶然性和上帝属性（全能、全知、全善）的词汇。卡拉姆宇宙论证用到“实际无限”和“时间回退”——这些必须精确使用。对于神正论，区分“更大善”与“灵魂塑造”。
- Necessary Being: a being that cannot not exist; its non-existence is impossible. 'Necessary = No way to perish, it must flourish.'
- 必然存在: 不可能不存在的存在；其不存在是不可能的。助记：“必然在，无可消，必存永不凋。”
- Contingent Being: depends on something else for its existence. 'Contingent = Can't exist independent.'
- 偶然存在: 其存在依赖于他物。助记：“偶然靠他物，独存无出路。”
- Ontological Argument: argues from the concept of God to his existence. 'Ontological goes conceptual, pure definitional.'
- 本体论论证: 从上帝的概念推出其存在。助记：“本体推存在，概念是王牌。”
- Teleological Argument: design argument – infers designer from apparent purpose. 'Teleo- reflects a designer's logo.'
- 目的论论证: 设计论证——从表面目的推出设计者。助记：“目的见设计，宇宙有匠气。”
5. Ethical Theories: Meta-Ethics & Normative Terms | 伦理理论：元伦理学与规范性术语
Eduqas candidates must navigate naturalism, non-naturalism, and error theory in meta-ethics, plus utilitarian, Kantian, and Aristotelian normative theories. The is-ought gap, supervenience, and the open question argument are vital. Associate G.E. Moore's 'yellow' with the naturalistic fallacy: 'Good is a simple, non-natural property; just like yellow can't be defined by its physical basis.'
Eduqas考生必须掌握元伦理学中的自然主义、非自然主义和错误理论，以及功利主义、康德义务论和亚里士多德德性伦理学等规范性理论。实然-应然鸿沟、伴随性以及开放问题论证都至关重要。把G.E.摩尔的“黄色”与自然主义谬误联系起来：“善是一种单纯的、非自然的属性；就像黄色不能通过其物理基础来定义。”
- Cognitivism: ethical statements express beliefs that can be true/false. 'Cognitivism = ethical claims like cognitive games, truth-apt.'
- 认知主义: 伦理陈述表达能够为真/假的信念。助记：“认知说伦理可真假，信念表达有对差。”
- Non-Cognitivism: ethical statements express emotions or prescriptions, not factual beliefs. 'Non-cognitivism: 'Boo!' or 'Hooray!' show the way.'
- 非认知主义: 伦理陈述表达情感或指令，而非事实信念。助记：“非认知喊嘘或赞，情绪指令不判断。”
- Utilitarianism: greatest happiness principle; act vs rule distinction. 'Utility counts pleasures, net balance treasures.'
- 功利主义: 最大幸福原则；行为与规则之分。助记：“功利算快乐，净额是真策。”
- Categorical Imperative: Kant's unconditional moral law, universalisable. 'Categorical = no 'if' tactical.'
- 绝对命令: 康德无条件道德律，可普遍化。助记：“绝对命令无条件，普遍立法行优先。”
6. Philosophy of Mind: Dualism, Materialism, and Identity | 心灵哲学：二元论、唯物主义与同一论
The mind-body problem generates a lexicon of '-isms'. Substance dualism posits two kinds of substance; property dualism says one substance with both mental and physical properties. Type identity theory claims mental states just are brain states, while functionalism defines mental states by their causal roles. 'Multiple realisability' is the functionalist's sword against identity theory. Use the silicon chip analogy: pain can be realised in carbon-based brains or silicon processors – same causal profile, different hardware.
心身问题产生了一系列“主义”的词汇。实体二元论假定两种实体；属性二元论认为一种实体同时具有心理和物理属性。类型同一论声称心理状态就是大脑状态，而功能主义则通过因果角色来定义心理状态。“多重可实现性”是功能主义针对同一论的利剑。用硅芯片类比：疼痛可以在碳基大脑或硅处理器中实现——相同的因果轮廓，不同的硬件。
- Substance Dualism: mind and body are distinct substances. Descartes' trademark. 'Two substances, no obstacles for the ghost in the machine.'
- 实体二元论: 心灵和身体是不同的实体。笛卡尔的标志。助记：“两实体，机中幽灵不消失。”
- Property Dualism: there are fundamental mental properties not reducible to physical ones. 'Same substance, extra mental fragrance.'
- 属性二元论: 存在不可还原为物理属性的基本心理属性。助记：“一实体，心理属性添气质。”
- Type Identity Theory: every type of mental state is identical to a type of brain state. 'Type = tight, a 1-to-1 mental-brain flight.'
- 类型同一论: 每种心理状态类型同一于一种大脑状态类型。助记：“类型对类型，心理大脑一一应。”
- Functionalism: mental states are defined by their functional role, not physical substrate. 'Function not stuff, that's enough.'
- 功能主义: 心理状态由其功能角色定义，而非物理基质。助记：“功能不论质，角色即本质。”
7. Logic & Argument Analysis | 逻辑与论证分析
id deductive argument guarantees the conclusion if premises are true. Soundness = validity + true premises. Contrast with inductive strength. The 'congnitive ease' trick: label premises P1, P2, C. When evaluating, ask: 'If we transplant the logical form into another context, does absurdity follow?' That's counterexample testing.
哲学考试要求分析精确。识别演绎与归纳论证、有效性、可靠性和非形式谬误。有效演绎论证保证如果前提真则结论必真。可靠性 = 有效性 + 前提真。与归纳强度对比。“认知便利”技巧：标记前提P1，P2，结论C。评估时问：“若将此逻辑形式移植到另一情境，会得出荒谬吗？”这就是反例检验。
- Validity: if premises true, conclusion must be true. 'Valid form forces the norm.'
- 有效性: 若前提真，结论必真。助记：“有效形式规范强，前提保证结论彰。”
- Soundness: a valid argument with all true premises. 'Sound is solid ground.'
- 可靠性: 所有前提皆真的有效论证。助记：“可靠奠基牢，前提全部真且有效。”
- Inductive Strength: premises make conclusion probable but not certain. 'Induction lifts probability, not certainty's nobility.'
- 归纳强度: 前提使结论可能为真但不必然。助记：“归纳提概率，不定必然位。”
8. Qualia, Intentionality, and Consciousness | 感受质、意向性与意识
These are often the hardest terms to pin down. Qualia are the subjective 'what-it-is-like' aspects of experience – the redness of red. Intentionality is the 'aboutness' of mental states: my thought of a unicorn is directed at an object, even if it doesn't exist. The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers) asks why physical processing gives rise to subjective experience at all. Use Nagel's bat: echolocation gives a bat's point of view, but we can't know 'what it is like' to be a bat, illustrating qualia and the explanatory gap.
这些常常是最难界定的术语。感受质是经验中“感觉像什么”的主观方面——红的感觉。意向性是心理状态的“关于性”：我关于独角兽的思考指向一个对象，即使它不存在。意识的困难问题（查尔默斯）追问为什么物理过程竟会产生主观体验。使用内格尔的蝙蝠：回声定位赋予蝙蝠的视角，但我们无法知道作为一只蝙蝠“感觉像什么”，这说明了感受质和解释鸿沟。
- Qualia: intrinsic, subjective phenomenal properties. 'Qualia = the feel, the real inner seal.'
- 感受质: 内在的、主观的现象属性。助记：“感受质是那个味儿，主观密封不可替。”
- Intentionality: the directedness of mental states onto objects or states of affairs. 'Intentionality points beyond, mental wand.'
- 意向性: 心理状态指向对象或事态的特性。助记：“意向性如箭指，心灵有靶子。”
- Explanatory Gap: the difficulty of explaining how physical processes produce conscious experience. 'Gap between brain and feel, philosophy's or-deal.'
- 解释鸿沟: 解释物理过程如何产生意识经验的困难。助记：“脑与觉中间裂，哲学大考阅。”
9. Free Will & Determinism | 自由意志与决定论
Compatibilism and incompatibilism frame the debate. Hard determinism says if determinism is true, free will is impossible. Libertarianism asserts free will is incompatible with determinism but insists we have it. Compatibilism redefines free will as the ability to act according to one's desires without external coercion. Remember Hume's 'liberty of spontaneity' vs 'liberty of indifference'. A key distinction: agent causation vs event causation. Picture a first domino: agent causation posits the agent as an uncaused cause, breaking the chain.
相容论与不相容论界定辩论框架。硬决定论说如果决定论为真，自由意志就不可能。自由意志论断言自由意志与决定论不相容，但坚持我们拥有它。相容论将自由意志重新定义为在无外部强制下按自己欲望行动的能力。记住休谟的“自发性自由”与“无差别自由”。关键区分：行为者因果与事件因果。想象第一张多米诺骨牌：行为者因果设定行为者是未受原因推动的原因，打破因果链。
- Compatibilism: free will is compatible with determinism. 'Compatible wills, no metaphysical frills.'
- 相容论: 自由意志与决定论相容。助记：“相容论调和自由与决定，无蝶翼之轻。”
- Hard Determinism: determinism is true and rules out free will. 'Hard determinism crushes freedom's prism.'
- 硬决定论: 决定论为真且排除自由意志。助记：“硬决定碾碎自由棱。”
- Moral Responsibility: the status of being deserving of praise or blame. Often linked to control. 'No free will, no moral bill.'
- 道德责任: 值得赞扬或责备的状态。常与控制相连。助记：“无自由意志，无道德账单立。”
10. Virtue Ethics & Aristotelian Concepts | 德性伦理学与亚里士多德概念
Aristotle's function argument and the doctrine of the mean are central. Eudaimonia is not fleeting happiness but flourishing. Phronesis (practical wisdom) is the intellectual virtue enabling us to discern the mean. Remember the table of virtues: courage as the mean between cowardice and rashness. The term 'habituation' reminds us that virtues are cultivated by practice, not lectures. For Eduqas, link to modern virtue ethics (Anscombe, MacIntyre) and the concept of 'internal goods' of a practice.
亚里士多德的功能论证和中道学说至关重要。Eudaimonia不是短暂快乐而是繁荣兴旺。Phronesis（实践智慧）是使我们能辨别中道的理智德性。记住德性表：勇敢是怯懦与鲁莽之间的中道。“习性化”一词提醒我们德性由实践培养，而非讲授。对Eduqas，联系现代德性伦理学（安斯康姆、麦金泰尔）和实践的“内在善”概念。
- Eudaimonia: human flourishing, the final end. 'Eu-daimonia, your good demon's euphoria.'
- Eudaimonia: 人的繁荣，最终目的。助记：“尤德莫尼亚，你的好精灵带来的幸福感。”
- Phronesis: practical wisdom, the master virtue. 'Phronesis = phone a wise friend, see the mean.'
- Phronesis: 实践智慧，主导德性。助记：“实践智，打给智者问中道。”
- Doctrine of the Mean: virtue is a midpoint between excess and deficiency. 'Golden mean, not too fat nor lean.'
- 中道学说: 德性是过度与不及之间的中点。助记：“中庸道，不胖不瘦刚刚好。”
11. Religious Language: Analogy, Symbol & Myth | 宗教语言：类比、象征与神话
The problem of religious language asks how finite words can describe an infinite God. Via negativa asserts we can only say what God is not. Aquinas's analogical predication (analogy of attribution and proportion) avoids univocal and equivocal pitfalls. For Eduqas, know how analogy is a middle way between univocity (same meaning) and equivocity (different meaning). Hick's 'myth' as a story that changes our perception but is not literally true is also essential. Use the sun analogy: God's goodness is like the sun's light – not identical but proportionally similar.
宗教语言问题追问有限词语如何描述无限的上帝。否定之路断言我们只能说上帝不是什么。阿奎那的类比谓述（归属类比和比例类比）避免了单义与歧义的陷阱。对Eduqas，要知道类比如何是单义（相同意义）与歧义（不同意义）之间的中间道路。希克的“神话”作为改变我们感知但并非字面真实的故事同样重要。使用太阳类比：上帝的善就像太阳的光——不等同但成比例相似。
- Via Negativa: the negative way; speaking of God only in terms of what he is not. 'Negate to state, avoid the trait debate.'
- 否定之路: 否定法；只用否定神不是什么来谈论上帝。助记：“否定表述，免谈正属性争持。”
- Univocal: when a term is used with exactly the same meaning. 'Uni-voice, same choice.'
- 单义的: 词语以完全相同的意义使用。助记：“单义同声，意义同框。”
- Equivocal: when a term is used with completely different meanings. 'Equi-vocal, different local.'
- 歧义的: 词语以完全不同的意义使用。助记：“歧义岔开，各说各派。”
12. Meta-Ethics: Naturalism vs Non-Naturalism | 元伦理学：自然主义与非自然主义
Naturalism holds that moral properties are natural properties, identifiable by empirical inquiry. Non-naturalism (Moore) insists moral properties are sui generis and known via intuition. The open question argument: for any naturalistic definition of 'good', we can always meaningfully ask 'But is that good?' showing that 'good' is not synonymous with any natural property. The is-ought gap (Hume) adds: descriptive premises can't yield an evaluative conclusion without an evaluative premise. Use the 'pleasure' example: Mills defines good as pleasure, but Moore asks, 'Is pleasure good?' – a meaningful, open question.
自然主义认为道德属性是自然属性，可通过经验探究识别。非自然主义（摩尔）坚持道德属性是自成一类的，通过直觉把握。开放问题论证：对于任何“善”的自然主义定义，我们总能意味深长地问“但那是善的吗？”表明“善”不与任何自然属性同义。实然-应然鸿沟（休谟）补充：描述性前提不能在没有评价性前提的情况下推出评价性结论。使用“快乐”例子：密尔将善定义为快乐，但摩尔问：“快乐是善的吗？”——一个有意义的开放问题。
- Naturalistic Fallacy: identifying 'good' with a natural property. 'Don't equate goodness with nature's furniture.'
- 自然主义谬误: 将“善”等同于某个自然属性。助记：“勿将善等同自然物。”
- Open Question Argument: shows 'good' is not analytically equivalent to any natural property. 'Open question remains open, no natural closure token.'
- 开放问题论证: 表明“善”在分析上不等同于任何自然属性。助记：“问题总开放，自然定义合不上。”
- Sui Generis: of its own kind; unique. 'Moral properties are sui generis, in a class of their own – don't clone.'
- 自成一类: 独特的；自有种类。助记：“道德属性独一类，不可还原克隆配。”
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