📚 Year 13 CCEA Philosophy: Glossary and Memory Hacks for Key Terms | CCEA 哲学高三：核心术语速记指南
Philosophy at CCEA Year 13 (A2) demands not only deep thinking but also precise use of technical vocabulary. This guide collects the must-know terms from across the specification — Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, Meta-ethics, Free Will, Philosophy of Mind and Descartes — and pairs each entry with a clear definition and a quick mnemonic or memory trick. By linking English and Chinese explanations, you can fix these terms firmly in long-term memory and deploy them with confidence in essays.
CCEA 高三（A2）哲学不仅要求深度思考，更要求精准运用专业术语。这份指南整理了整个考纲中必须掌握的概念——涵盖认识论、宗教哲学、伦理学、元伦理学、自由意志、心灵哲学和笛卡尔作品——每个条目都配有清晰的定义和快速助记法。通过中英文对照，你可以把这些术语牢牢存入长期记忆，并在论文中自信地使用它们。
1. Epistemology: The Basics of Knowledge | 认识论：知识的基础
In epistemology we ask what knowledge is. The classic definition is justified true belief (JTB). A priori knowledge is independent of experience; a posteriori depends on it. Analytic truths are true by definition; synthetic truths add new information.
在认识论中，我们追问什么是知识。经典定义是“得到辩护的真信念”（JTB）。先验知识独立于经验；后验知识依赖经验。分析命题凭定义即为真；综合命题则增添新信息。
A priori — knowledge knowable without sense experience, e.g., 'All bachelors are unmarried'. Memory trick: 'A priori – already in the mind, no need to go outside.'
先验 — 无需感官经验即可知晓的知识，如“所有单身汉都未婚”。记忆窍门：“先验 – 天生就在脑子里，不用出门看。”
A posteriori — knowledge that depends on experience, e.g., 'The cat is on the mat'. Think: 'post' = after experience.
后验 — 依赖经验的知识，如“猫在垫子上”。记住：post 是“经验之后”。
Analytic proposition — true by virtue of the meaning of words alone. Imagine analysing a word and finding the truth already inside it.
分析命题 — 仅凭词义即为真。可以想象“分析”一个词，发现真值早已藏在里面。
Synthetic proposition — truth depends on how the world is. Synthetic glue brings together two formerly separate ideas.
综合命题 — 真值取决于世界如何。合成胶水把两个原先分离的概念粘在一起。
Justified true belief (JTB) — S knows that P if and only if P is true, S believes that P, and S is justified in believing P. JTB = 'Just Try Believing' (with good reason).
得到辩护的真信念 — 某人知道 P，当且仅当 P 为真、他相信 P、并且他的相信有辩护。JTB = “必须真信有理由”。
Scepticism — the view that knowledge is impossible or very limited. Global scepticism doubts everything; local scepticism doubts a specific domain.
怀疑论 — 认为知识不可能或极其有限的观点。全面怀疑论怀疑一切；局部怀疑论只怀疑特定领域。
2. Philosophy of Religion: God and Arguments | 宗教哲学：上帝与论证
This area explores rational arguments for and against God's existence, the nature of religious language, and the problem of evil. Key terms help you dissect the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments.
这一领域探究支持与反对上帝存在的理性论证、宗教语言的本质以及恶的问题。关键术语可以帮助你剖析本体论、宇宙论和目的论论证。
Theism — belief in a God who is personal, omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Theist = 'Theo + ist' – one who affirms God.
有神论 — 相信有一位具有位格、全能、全知、全善的上帝。有神论者 = 肯定神存在的人。
Atheism — the absence of belief in God or gods. 'A-' = without, so a-theist = without God.
无神论 — 不相信神或众神存在。“A-”表示“无”，所以无神论者即“无神”。
Agnosticism — the suspension of judgement, claiming we cannot know whether God exists. 'A-gnostic' = not knowing.
不可知论 — 悬置判断，声称我们无法知道上帝是否存在。“不可知”即不知道。
Ontological argument — argues from the concept of God as the greatest conceivable being to God's necessary existence. Anselm: 'God exists in the understanding. A being that exists in reality is greater. So God must exist in reality.'
本体论论证 — 从“上帝是可设想的最伟大存在者”这一概念推出上帝必然存在。安瑟伦：“上帝存在于理智中。存在于现实中的存在者更伟大。所以上帝必然存在于现实中。”
Cosmological argument — argues from the existence of the cosmos to a first cause or necessary being. Aquinas' First Way: from motion to an Unmoved Mover.
宇宙论论证 — 从宇宙的存在推出第一因或必然存在者。阿奎那第一路：从运动推出一个不被推动的推动者。
Teleological argument — argues from apparent design and purpose in nature to a designer. 'Telos' = purpose. Think of Paley's watch.
目的论论证 — 从自然界中明显的设计和目的推出一位设计者。“Telos”即目的。想起佩利的手表就行。
Problem of evil — the challenge that the existence of evil and suffering is incompatible with an all-loving, all-powerful God. Logical problem: inconsistent triad. Evidential problem: amount and distribution of evil.
恶的问题 — 挑战在于：恶与痛苦的存在与一位全爱全能的上帝不相容。逻辑问题：不一致三角。证据问题：恶的数量与分布。
Theodicy — an attempt to justify God's goodness despite evil. 'Theo-dicy': justifying God. Example: Augustine's free-will defence.
神义论 — 试图在恶存在的情况下为上帝的良善辩护。“神义”即为上帝辩护。比如奥古斯丁的自由意志辩护。
3. Religious Language: Meaning and Reference | 宗教语言：意义与指称
How can finite human language talk meaningfully about an infinite God? The via negativa, analogy and symbol are classic responses. You must also know verification and falsification challenges.
有限的人类语言如何能有意义地谈论无限的上帝？否定之路、类比和象征是经典的回应。你还必须了解可证实性与可证伪性的挑战。
Via negativa (apophatic way) — speaking of God only in terms of what He is not. Example: God is not limited, not mortal. It preserves mystery but risks leaving us with no positive knowledge.
否定之路（遮诠法） — 只用“不是什么”来谈论上帝。例：上帝不是有限的，不是会死的。这保护了神秘性，但有可能会让我们得不到任何正面知识。
Analogy (Aquinas) — a middle way between univocal (same meaning) and equivocal (different meaning). Analogy of attribution: God is called 'good' because he is the cause of goodness in creatures. Analogy of proportion: creatures possess qualities proportionally to their nature; God possesses them in a higher mode.
类比（阿奎那） — 介于单义（同一含义）和歧义（完全不同含义）之间的中间道路。归因类比：我们称上帝为“善”，因为他是受造物善性的原因。比例类比：受造物按其本性按比例拥有性质；上帝以更高方式拥有它们。
Symbol (Tillich) — a sign that participates in the reality to which it points. Religious symbols open up levels of reality and the soul. Unlike a mere sign, a symbol 'has a life of its own'.
象征（蒂利希） — 参与其所指之实在的符号。宗教象征开启了实在与灵魂的层次。与单纯符号不同，象征“有自己的生命”。
Verification principle (logical positivists) — a statement is meaningful only if it is analytic or empirically verifiable. Religious language was deemed meaningless because it cannot be verified by sense experience.
可证实性原则（逻辑实证主义者） — 一个陈述只有是分析的或是可被经验证实的才有意义。宗教语言被认为无意义，因为它无法被感官经验证实。
Falsification principle (Flew) — meaningful assertions must be falsifiable: we must be able to say what would count against them. Flew's challenge: 'What would have to occur to constitute for you a disproof of God's love?' If nothing, the assertion 'dies the death of a thousand qualifications'.
可证伪性原则（弗卢） — 有意义的断言必须是可证伪的：我们必须能说出什么情况会算作对它的反对。弗卢的挑战：“必须发生什么才会让你承认上帝的爱被反驳了？”如果没有任何情况，这个断言就会“死于一千次限定”。
4. Ethics: Normative Theories | 伦理学：规范理论
Normative ethics tells us how we ought to act. Deontology focuses on duties, consequentialism on outcomes, and virtue ethics on character. Knowing the precise terminology will sharpen your evaluation of these theories.
规范伦理学告诉我们应当如何行动。义务论聚焦于责任，后果主义聚焦于结果，德性伦理学聚焦于品格。熟知精确术语能让你对这些理论的评价更加犀利。
Deontology — the ethical theory that the rightness of an act depends on its intrinsic nature or its conformity to a rule, not on its consequences. 'Deon' = duty. Kant: 'Do your duty for its own sake.'
义务论 — 一种伦理理论，认为行为的对错取决于其内在性质或是否符合规则，而非其后果。“Deon”即义务。康德：“为尽义务而尽义务。”
Categorical imperative (Kant) — an unconditional moral command that applies to all rational beings. First formulation: 'Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'
定言命令（康德） — 适用于所有理性存在者的无条件道德命令。第一表述：“只按照你同时能够意愿它成为一个普遍法则的那条准则去行动。”
Hypothetical imperative — a conditional command: 'If you want X, do Y.' It binds only those who have the relevant desire.
假言命令 — 有条件性的命令：“如果你想得到 X，就去做 Y。”它只约束那些有相关欲望的人。
Consequentialism — the rightness of an act is determined solely by its consequences. Utilitarianism is the best-known version: greatest happiness for the greatest number.
后果主义 — 行为的对错只由其后果决定。功利主义是最著名的版本：最大多数人的最大幸福。
Act utilitarianism (Bentham) — each individual action should be judged by how much pleasure/pain it produces. Bentham's hedonic calculus weighs intensity, duration, certainty, etc.
行为功利主义（边沁） — 每一个别行为都应根据它产生的快乐/痛苦数量来评判。边沁的快乐计算法权衡强度、持续时间、确定性等。
Rule utilitarianism (Mill) — follow rules that tend to produce the greatest happiness overall. Mill distinguishes higher and lower pleasures: 'Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.'
规则功利主义（密尔） — 遵循那些总体上能产生最大幸福的规则。密尔区分高级和低级快乐：“宁做不满足的苏格拉底，也不做满足的傻瓜。”
Virtue ethics (Aristotle) — focuses on the agent's character and the virtues. The good life is one of eudaimonia (flourishing). Golden Mean: courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness.
德性伦理学（亚里士多德） — 关注行动者的品格与德性。好生活即 eudaimonia（繁荣）。中庸之道：勇敢是懦弱与鲁莽之间的中道。
5. Meta-ethics: The Status of Moral Language | 元伦理学：道德语言的地位
Meta-ethics asks what we are doing when we make moral judgements. Are we stating facts, expressing emotions, or something else? These terms help you navigate the realism/anti-realism debate.
元伦理学追问：当我们作出道德判断时，我们在做什么？我们在陈述事实、表达情感，还是其他？这些术语可以帮助你在实在论与反实在论之争中辨明方向。
Cognitivism — the view that moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false. Think 'cognitive' = knowable. 'Murder is wrong' is a proposition with a truth-value.
认知主义 — 认为道德陈述表达可判真假的信念。“认知”即可以知道。比如“谋杀是错的”是一个具有真值的命题。
Non-cognitivism — moral statements do not express beliefs; they express emotions, prescriptions, or attitudes. They are neither true nor false. Ayer's emotivism: 'Murder is wrong!' just means 'Boo to murder!'
非认知主义 — 道德陈述不表达信念，而表达情感、规定或态度。它们既不真也不假。艾耶尔的情绪主义：“谋杀是错的！”只不过等于“谋杀，呸！”
Naturalism (ethical) — moral properties are natural properties; moral terms can be defined in non-moral terms. Bentham: 'good' = 'pleasure'. Moore's open question argument challenges this: is pleasure good? The question remains open.
自然主义（伦理学） — 道德属性就是自然属性；道德术语可用非道德术语来定义。边沁：“善”=“快乐”。摩尔用开放问题反驳：快乐是善的吗？这个问题始终是开放的。
Intuitionism (Moore) — 'good' is a simple, non-natural, indefinable property known by intuition. Just as we cannot define 'yellow', we cannot define 'good' — we just recognise it.
直觉主义（摩尔） — “善”是一种单纯、非自然、不可定义的性质，通过直觉认知。就像我们无法定义“黄色”一样，我们无法定义“善”——我们只是直接认出它。
Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson) — moral utterances are expressions of emotion and attempts to influence others. 'Stealing is wrong' = 'I disapprove of stealing; do so as well.'
情绪主义（艾耶尔、史蒂文森） — 道德话语是情感的表达以及对他人施加影响的企图。“偷窃是错的”=“我不赞成偷窃；你也如此吧。”
Prescriptivism (Hare) — moral judgements are universalisable prescriptions. When I say 'Killing is wrong', I am committed to the imperative 'Do not kill' in all relevantly similar situations.
规定主义（黑尔） — 道德判断是可普遍化的规定。当我说“杀人是错的”，我就承诺了在所有相关类似情形下都应遵守“不要杀人”这一命令。
6. Free Will and Determinism | 自由意志与决定论
Are our choices free, or are they determined by prior causes? The compatibility debate distinguishes hard determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism. Each position brings its own vocabulary.
我们的选择是自由的，还是被在先原因决定的？相容性之争区分了硬决定论、自由意志论和相容论。每个立场都带来了自己的术语。
Determinism — the thesis that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and the laws of nature. Universal causation leaves no room for free will, according to hard determinism.
决定论 — 认为每个事件都由在先事件和自然法则必然地决定的论题。普遍因果性不留任何自由意志的余地，硬决定论如此主张。
Hard determinism — determinism is true, therefore free will is an illusion. Incompatibilist position: free will and determinism cannot coexist.
硬决定论 — 决定论为真，因此自由意志是一种幻觉。不相容论立场：自由意志与决定论无法共存。
Libertarianism (metaphysical) — we do have free will, so determinism must be false. Agent-causal libertarians hold that agents are uncaused causes. Event-causal libertarians accept indeterministic causation.
自由意志论（形而上学的） — 我们确实有自由意志，所以决定论必然为假。行动者原因自由意志论认为行动者是非受动的原因。事件原因自由意志论接受非决定论的因果性。
Compatibilism (soft determinism) — free will and determinism are compatible. Freedom is the ability to act according to one's desires without external coercion. Hume: 'hypothetical liberty'.
相容论（软决定论） — 自由意志与决定论相容。自由是按照自己的欲望行动而不受外部强制的的能力。休谟：“假言自由”。
Principle of alternate possibilities — an agent acts freely only if she could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases challenge this by suggesting we can be free even if we couldn't have done otherwise.
可替换可能性原则 — 一个行动者只有能够在其他可能性之间作出选择时才是自由地行动。法兰克福式反例对此提出挑战：即使我们不能做别样的行动，我们也可能是自由的。
Moral responsibility — the status of being deserving of praise or blame. Hard determinists argue that without free will, moral responsibility is undermined. Compatibilists argue it can be preserved.
道德责任 — 值得赞扬或责备的地位。硬决定论认为没有自由意志就没有道德责任。相容论认为道德责任可以保留。
7. Philosophy of Mind: Dualism and Materialism | 心灵哲学：二元论与唯物论
What is the relationship between mind and body? Are mental states simply brain states, or is there something irreducibly subjective? You need to pin down dualism, behaviourism, identity theory and functionalism.
心灵与身体之间是什么关系？心理状态仅仅是大脑状态，还是存在某种不可还原的主观之物？你需要牢牢掌握二元论、行为主义、同一论和功能主义。
Substance dualism (Descartes) — the mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body. The real distinction argument: 'I can clearly and distinctly conceive of myself existing without my body, therefore mind and body are distinct.'
实体二元论（笛卡尔） — 心灵是一种不同于身体的非物理实体。真实区分论证：“我能清楚分明地设想自己离开身体而存在，所以心灵与身体不同。”
Property dualism — there is only one substance (physical) but it has both physical and non-physical properties. Chalmers' 'hard problem' of consciousness drives this view: subjective qualia resist physical explanation.
属性二元论 — 只有一种实体（物理的），但它既有物理属性也有非物理属性。查尔默斯的意识“困难问题”驱动了这种观点：主观的感受质拒绝物理说明。
Qualia — the 'what-it-is-like' of experience: the redness of red, the painfulness of pain. Frank Jackson's knowledge argument: Mary the colour scientist learns something new when she sees red for the first time.
感受质 — 经验中的“感觉如何”：红色的红感，疼痛的痛感。弗兰克·杰克逊的知识论证：色彩科学家玛丽第一次看到红色时学到了新的东西。
Behaviourism (philosophical) — mental states are just dispositions to behave in certain ways. Ryle: the 'ghost in the machine' is a category mistake. To be in pain is to wince, cry out, seek comfort, etc.
行为主义（哲学的） — 心理状态仅仅是倾向于以某种方式行为的倾向。赖尔：“机器中的幽灵”是一个范畴错误。疼痛无非就是皱眉头、哭叫、寻求安慰等行为倾向。
Mind-brain identity theory — mental states are numerically identical to brain states. . Type-identity: each type of mental state is identical to a type of brain state (e.g., pain = C-fibres firing).
心脑同一论 — 心理状态与大脑状态在数字上同一。类型同一论：每种心理状态与一种大脑状态类型同一（如疼痛 = C-纤维激活）。
Functionalism — mental states are defined by their causal roles: what typically causes them and what they cause. Multiple realizability: the same mental state can be realized by different physical substrates (brain, silicon, etc.).
功能主义 — 心理状态由其因果角色来定义：一般什么引起它们，它们又引起什么。多重可实现性：同一种心理状态可以由不同的物理基底实现（大脑、硅芯片等）。
8. Descartes' Epistemology: Cogito and Clear and Distinct Ideas | 笛卡尔的认识论：我思与清楚分明
Descartes' Meditations feature in many CCEA specifications. You must be fluent in his terminology, from radical doubt to the trademark argument. These terms form the backbone of any Cartesian essay.
笛卡尔的《第一哲学沉思集》出现在多个 CCEA 考纲中。你必须熟练掌握他的术语，从彻底怀疑到“商标论证”。这些术语是任何笛卡尔主题论文的骨干。
Cogito ergo sum — 'I think, therefore I am.' The one indubitable truth surviving the evil demon doubt. Even if I am being deceived, I must exist as a thinking thing in order to be deceived.
我思故我在 — “我思考，所以我存在。” 这是逃脱恶灵欺骗的唯一不容置疑的真理。即使我在被欺骗，为了能被欺骗，我也必须作为一个在思考的东西而存在。
Cartesian doubt (methodological scepticism) — Descartes' strategy of doubting all beliefs that can be doubted until reaching something certain. Three waves of doubt: senses, dreaming, evil demon.
笛卡尔式怀疑（方法论上的怀疑） — 笛卡尔怀疑一切可被怀疑的信念，直到找到某种确实之物的策略。三波怀疑：感官、梦境、恶灵。
Clear and distinct perception — the criterion for truth: whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. 'Clear' = present and accessible to the attentive mind; 'distinct' = sharply separated from all other perceptions.
清楚分明的知觉 — 真理的标准：凡我非常清楚分明地知觉到的都是真的。“清楚” = 向专注的心灵呈现并可通达；“分明” = 与所有其他知觉截然区分。
Trademark argument — I have an idea of God as an infinite, perfect substance. This idea must come from a being that possesses those perfections formally. Only God Himself can be the cause. Hence God exists.
商标论证 — 我有一个关于上帝的无限、完善实体的观念。这个观念必然来自一个在形式上拥有那些完善性的存在者。只有上帝自身才能是其原因。因此上帝存在。
Cartesian circle — the alleged circularity: Descartes uses clear and distinct ideas to prove God, then uses God to guarantee clear and distinct ideas. Is he trapped in a circle? Scholars debate whether memory or divine guarantee breaks it.
笛卡尔循环 — 所谓的循环论证：笛卡尔用清楚分明的观念证明上帝，又用上帝来保障清楚分明的观念。他陷入循环了吗？学者们争论记忆或神圣担保能否打破这个循环。
Res cogitans and res extensa — thinking substance and extended substance. n-spatial. Body = extended, spatial. This division is the foundation of substance dualism.
思维实体与广延实体 — 思维实体与广延实体。心灵 = 思维，不占空间。身体 = 广延，占空间。这一区分是实体二元论的基石。
9. Logic and Argument Evaluation | 逻辑与论证评估
Every Philosophy essay depends on your ability to spot valid, sound and fallacious reasoning. These logical terms are your toolkit for analysing arguments in any topic.
每一篇哲学论文都依赖于你辨别有效、可靠与谬误推理的能力。这些逻辑术语是你在任何题目中分析论证的工具箱。
Deductive argument — if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Valid deductive arguments aim for certainty. Example: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal.
演绎论证 — 如果前提为真，结论必然为真。有效的演绎论证追求确定性。例：所有人都会死。苏格拉底是人。所以苏格拉底会死。
Inductive argument — the premises provide good but not conclusive support for the conclusion. Reasoning from observed cases to generalisations, as in the teleological argument.
归纳论证 — 前提为结论提供良好但非决定性的支持。从观察个案推出普遍论断，如目的论论证。
Validity — a deductive argument is valid if the conclusion logically follows from the premises. Validity is about structure, not actual truth. A valid argument can have false premises.
有效性 — 一个演绎论证是有效的，当结论逻辑地从前提推出。有效性关乎结构，而非实际真值。有效论证的前提可以是假的。
Soundness — a deductive argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are actually true. Sound = valid + true premises. A sound argument guarantees a true conclusion.
可靠性 — 一个演绎论证是可靠的，当它有效且所有前提实际为真。可靠 = 有效 + 真前提。可靠的论证保证结论为真。
Fallacy — a common error in reasoning that undermines the argument. Example: ad hominem (attacking the person, not the argument); post hoc ergo propter hoc (false cause).
谬误 — 削弱论证的常见推理错误。例：人身攻击（攻击人而非论点）；后此谬误（虚假因果）。
Counterexample — a particular instance that contradicts a general claim. Effective against universal statements: 'All JTB is knowledge' — Gettier cases serve as counterexamples.
反例
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