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High-Frequency Topics and Common Mistakes in Year 12 CIE Philosophy | Year 12 CIE 哲学:高频考点与易错题分析

2026-07-22 21:06 · 本文部分内容由AI辅助创作

📚 High-Frequency Topics and Common Mistakes in Year 12 CIE Philosophy | Year 12 CIE 哲学:高频考点与易错题分析

Year 12 CIE Philosophy (9694) introduces students to four core themes: Reason and Experience, Mind and Body, Personal Identity, and Free Will and Determinism. While the syllabus is compact, examiners consistently test a set of high-frequency arguments and concepts. Many students lose marks not because they lack knowledge, but because they fall into predictable traps when constructing essays or evaluating philosophical positions. This article breaks down the most commonly examined topics and the typical mistakes made in AS-level papers, equipping you with strategies to turn common weaknesses into top-band responses.

Year 12 CIE 哲学(9694)为学生引入了四个核心主题:理性与经验、心灵与身体、个人身份、自由意志与决定论。虽然大纲内容紧凑,但考官反复考察的是一组高频论证和概念。许多学生失分并非因为知识欠缺,而是因为在组织论文或评估哲学立场时掉入了可预见的陷阱。本文拆解最常见的考点以及 AS 阶段试卷中的典型错误,帮助你掌握把常见弱点转化为高分答案的策略。


1. Justifying A Priori Knowledge in Reason and Experience | 理性与经验中先天知识的辩护

analytic/synthetic distinction. A priori knowledge is independent of experience, while analytic truths are true by virtue of meaning. Kant' tic a priori shows these categories do not perfectly overlap. A common mistake is to treat '2+2=4' analytic without discussing whether arithmetic can be reduced to logic, or to ignore Quine's holistic challenge to the analytic-synthetic divide altogether.

高频考题会问是否所有先天知识都是分析的。学生经常混淆先天/后天与分析/综合这两组区分。先天知识独立于经验,而分析真理是凭借意义而为真。康德的先天综合判断表明这些范畴并不完全重叠。一个常见错误是把“2+2=4”当作分析命题却未讨论算术是否可还原为逻辑,或者完全忽略蒯因对分析-综合区分的整体论挑战。

Examiners report that weaker responses simply define the terms and state a position without engaging with counterarguments. To score high AO2 marks, you must evaluate whether the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge is genuinely established. A strong essay weighs Kant's argument from geometry and causation against empiricist replies, such as Ayer's claim that necessary truths are merely linguistic conventions. Avoid asserting that 'all a priori knowledge is innate'—that conflates epistemology with claims about origins, which is a separate, mark-losing error.

考官报告指出,较弱的答案仅定义术语并陈述立场,却不触及反论证。要获得高的 AO2 分数,你必须评估先天综合知识的存在是否真正得到确证。一篇有力的论文会权衡康德从几何学和因果性出发的论证,与艾耶尔关于必然真理仅是语言约定的经验主义回应。避免断言“所有先天知识都是天赋的”——这混淆了认识论与关于起源的主张,这种错误会导致失分。


2. The Gettier Problem and the JTB Definition of Knowledge | 盖梯尔问题与 JTB 知识定义

Gettier cases appear in almost every examination session, either as a standalone question or embedded within broader epistemology topics. The standard mistake is to describe a Gettier-style counterexample without clearly identifying which of the JTB conditions is satisfied but insufficient. Many students state 'justified true belief is not sufficient' but fail to explain why the belief is only accidentally true, thereby missing the crucial epistemic luck element.

盖梯尔案例几乎出现在每次考试中,无论是作为独立题目还是嵌入更广泛的认识论主题。标准错误是描述盖梯尔式反例却没有明确说明 JTB 条件中哪一个被满足但并不充分。许多学生会说“得到辩护的真信念并不充分”,却未能解释为什么该信念仅仅是偶然为真,从而遗漏了关键的认知运气要素。

Another frequent error is to treat 'no false lemmas' as a complete solution without discussing its own counterexamples, such as the barn facade case. A top-tier answer explores why the 'no false lemmas' condition rules out Smith's inference in the original Gettier case but struggles with cases where the belief is formed through a generally reliable process that happens to malfunction. Remember to evaluate structural responses to Gettier, such as reliabilism and virtue epistemology, and to note that the problem shifted the focus from justification to warrant.

另一个常见错误是把“无错误引理”当作完整的解决方案,却不讨论它自身的反例,比如假谷仓案例。顶级答案会探讨为什么“无错误引理”条件排除了原初盖梯尔案例中史密斯的推论,却难以处理信念通过一般可靠但恰好失灵的过程而形成的案例。记得要评估对盖梯尔的结构性回应,如可靠主义和德性知识论,并指出该问题将焦点从辩护转向了担保。


3. Cartesian Dualism and the Interaction Problem | 笛卡尔二元论与互动问题

Descartes's conceivability argument and the indivisibility argument are standard high-frequency material. Examiners see countless scripts that repeat the indubitable 'I think therefore I am' without linking it directly to substance dualism. The real challenge is to articulate why conceivability entails metaphysical possibility, and whether Descartes is entitled to move from 'I can conceive of mind without body' to 'mind and body are distinct substances'. This is where most candidates lose marks, as they skip the crucial premise that clear and distinct perception guarantees truth.

笛卡尔的可设想性论证与不可分性论证是标准的高频材料。考官见过无数答卷重复不容置疑的“我思故我在”,却不将其直接与实体二元论联系起来。真正的挑战在于阐明为何可设想性蕴含形而上学的可能性,以及笛卡尔是否有权从“我能设想心脱离身”推出“心与身是不同的实体”。这正是大多数考生失分之处,因为他们跳过了清晰分明的感知保证真理这一关键前提。

Princess Elisabeth's interaction problem is the most common objection examined. A typical error is to describe the problem superficially: 'How can an immaterial mind move a material body?' without formalising the causal principle at stake. Strong answers present the causal closure of the physical as a modern reformulation, noting that if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, mental causation appears redundant or epiphenomenal. Avoid oversimplifying solutions such as occasionalism or parallelism; instead, evaluate whether they sacrifice the commonsense view of mind-body interaction. Property dualism and its own causal exclusion issue can be used as a contrasting response that circumvents Cartesian substance dualism's specific problems.

伊丽莎白公主的互动问题是最常考察的反驳。典型错误是肤浅地描述问题:“非物质的心灵如何移动物质的身体?” 却不将其中涉及的因果原则形式化。强有力的答案会把物理领域的因果闭合作为现代重述,指出如果每个物理事件都有充分的物理原因,那么心理因果性就显得多余或成为副现象。避免过度简化偶因论或平行论等解决方案;相反,要评估它们是否牺牲了常识的心身互动观。属性二元论及其自身的因果排斥问题可用作对比回应,以规避笛卡尔实体二元论的特定难题。


4. Psychological Continuity and the Duplication Problem | 心理连续性与复制问题

Personal identity questions frequently centre on Locke's memory criterion and its psychological successor theories. Students are comfortable explaining that a person at t₂ is identical to a person at t₁ if there is a chain of overlapping memories. However, the duplication problem, crystallised by Parfit's teletransportation thought experiment, catches many off guard. The error is to treat psychological continuity as a one-to-one relation when, in fission cases, the relation holds between one original and two resulting persons. This challenges the logic of identity, which demands transitivity and uniqueness.

个人身份问题经常围绕洛克的记忆标准及其心理继承理论。学生能自如地解释,如果存在重叠记忆链,t₂时刻的人与 t₁时刻的人是同一的。然而,由帕菲特远距传送思想实验所凝聚的复制问题,却让许多人措手不及。错误在于将心理连续性视为一对一关系,而在分裂案例中,该关系存在于一个原初者与两个结果者之间。这挑战了同一性的逻辑,因为它要求传递性和唯一性。

The common pitfall is to dismiss the duplication problem by asserting 'only one of them is truly me' without providing non-arbitrary criteria. To gain AO2 marks, you must engage with Parfit's conclusion that identity is not what matters for survival, but rather Relation R. Many candidates wrongly claim that Parfit eliminates personal identity altogether, whereas he argues against its importance. A nuanced essay contrasts the simple psychological view, the wide psychological view (which allows multiple occupancy), and the somatic view, showing how each handles fission. Avoid stating that the brain transplant scenario 'proves' the psychological view—that misunderstands the thought experiment's purpose.

常见的陷阱是用“只有其中一个才真正是我”来打发复制问题,却不提供非任意的标准。想要获得 AO2 分数,你必须讨论帕菲特的结论:重要的不是同一性,而是关系 R。许多考生错误地声称帕菲特完全取消了个人身份,但他只是反对其重要性。一篇有深度的论文会对比简单心理观点、宽心理观点(允许多重占据)和身体观点,展示它们各自如何处理分裂问题。避免声称大脑移植情景“证明”了心理观点——那误解了该思想实验的目的。


5. The Consequence Argument and Compatibilism's Response | 后果论证与相容论的回应

The consequence argument for incompatibilism, formulated by van Inwagen, is a recurring feature of free will questions. The argument holds that if determinism is true, our acts are the consequences of the distant past and the laws of nature, neither of which we have control over. Therefore, we have no control over our acts. The common error in student responses is to conflate determinism with fatalism or to reject the argument by simply insisting that we feel free. This misses the point: the argument grants the feeling of freedom but questions its rational grounding.

由范·因瓦根阐发的不相容论的后果论证,是自由意志考题中反复出现的内容。该论证认为,如果决定论为真,我们的行为就是遥远过去和自然律的后果,而这两者我们均无法控制,因此我们无法控制自己的行为。学生回答中的常见错误是把决定论与宿命论混为一谈,或者通过单纯坚称我们感觉自由来驳斥该论证。这偏离了要点:该论证承认自由的感觉,但质疑其理性根据。

Compatibilism, especially as articulated by Hume and later classical compatibilists, is a high-frequency counterpoint. Students tend to define 'freedom as the ability to do otherwise' in a conditional sense (could have done otherwise if I had chosen otherwise) without noting the regress problem: was the choice itself determined? A sophisticated essay explores the distinction between 'could have done otherwise' and 'could have chosen otherwise'. Furthermore, many answers ignore contemporary compatibilist developments, such as Frankfurt's hierarchical desires and the rejection of the principle of alternate possibilities. To reach the highest band, you must evaluate whether compatibilism merely redefines freedom to make it compatible with determinism, thus potentially 'quarantining' moral responsibility rather than genuinely solving the problem.

相容论,尤其是休谟和后来的经典相容论者所阐发的那种,是高频回应。学生倾向于在条件意义上将“自由定义为能够做其他选择”(如果当时做出其他选择,就能做其他行为),却没有注意到回溯问题:那个选择本身是被决定的吗?一篇精深的论文会探讨“能够做其他行为”与“能够做其他选择”之间的区分。此外,许多答案忽视了当代相容论发展,比如法兰克福的层级欲望以及对替代可能性原则的拒斥。要进入最高档次,你必须评估相容论是否仅仅是重新定义自由以使之与决定论兼容,从而可能“隔离”道德责任,而非真正解决问题。


6. Structuring 25-Mark Essays with the PEEL Model | 用 PEEL 模型构建 25 分论文

A pervasive mistake across all topics is writing descriptive lists of philosophical positions instead of sustained, evaluative arguments. The PEEL structure—Point, Evidence/Example, Explanation, Link—provides a reliable framework. Each paragraph should open with a clear thesis statement, which is then supported by a precise reference to a philosopher's argument, followed by an explanation of its reasoning, and finally linked back to the question. Students who omit the Explanation step often lose marks because they assume the evidence speaks for itself.

在所有主题中,一个普遍性错误是写描述性的哲学立场列表,而不是持续性的评估论证。PEEL 结构——观点、论据/例子、解释、回链——提供了一个可靠的框架。每个段落应以明确的论点句开头,然后引述哲学家的精确论证作为支撑,接着解释其推理,最后回链至题目。省略解释步骤的学生常常丢分,因为他们以为论据本身会说话。

A classic example is discussing Mind and Body: 'Descartes argues that mind and body are distinct substances because he can clearly and distinctly perceive them apart.' This is a statement, not an argument. The missing explanation involves unpacking the principle of clear and distinct perception, bridging the epistemic to the metaphysical, and highlighting the assumption that God would not deceive. Furthermore, when linking back, do not simply repeat the question; instead, state explicitly how this argument strengthens, weakens, or complicates the overall thesis. An exam technique tip: use mini-conclusions at the end of paragraphs to sustain a sense of progression.

一个经典例子是讨论心灵与身体:“笛卡尔论证心与身是不同的实体,因为他能清楚地和分明地感知到它们的分离。” 这是一个陈述,而不是论证。缺失的解释包括展开清晰分明的感知原则,从认识论过渡到形而上学,并突显上帝不会欺骗的假定。此外,在回链时,不要仅仅重复问题;相反,要明确陈述该论证如何加强、削弱或复杂化了整体论题。一个考试技巧提示:在段落末尾使用小结论来保持推进感。


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7. Evaluating Arguments by Spotting Logical Fallacies | 通过识别逻辑谬误来评估论证

AS Philosophy requires candidates to assess the strength of arguments, but many struggle to diagnose precisely where an argument fails. Common fallacies appear in stimulus material and in students' own reasoning. The fallacy of affirming the consequent is particularly relevant to discussions of scepticism and perceptual experience: 'If I perceive an object, it must exist; I have a perceptual experience; therefore, the object exists.' Examiners note that candidates sometimes accept weak analogical arguments in Personal Identity, such as the 'ship of Theseus' applied to organic bodies without addressing disanalogies like biological continuity.

AS 哲学要求考生评估论证的强度,但许多人难以精确诊断论证在哪一点上失败。常见谬误出现在刺激材料和学生自己的推理中。肯定后件的谬误与怀疑论和感知经验的讨论尤为相关:“如果我感知到一个对象,那么这个对象一定存在;我拥有感知经验;因此,该对象存在。” 考官注意到,考生有时会接受个人身份话题中较弱的类比论证,比如将“忒修斯之船”用于有机体却不处理生物连续性等不相似之处。

In Free Will discussions, the appeal to consequences is a hidden trap. Students may argue that we must have free will because otherwise we could not hold people morally responsible. This pragmatic justification does not constitute an argument for the existence of free will. To improve, you should consistently ask whether any proposition in the argument requires a non-logical leap. When critiquing an opposing view, avoid straw-man representations: always present the strongest version of the argument you intend to criticise, then demonstrate its internal inconsistency or inability to account for a counterexample.

在自由意志的讨论中,诉诸后果是一个隐藏的陷阱。学生可能会论证我们必定拥有自由意志,因为否则我们就无法让人们对行为承担道德责任。这种实用主义辩护并不构成对自由意志存在的论证。为了改进,你应当持续追问该论证中是否有任何命题需要非逻辑的跳跃。在批评对立观点时,避免稻草人式的表述:永远先给出你意图批评的论证的最强版本,然后展示其内在的不一致性或无法解释某个反例。


8. Balancing Arguments in Comparative Questions | 比较性题目中的平衡论证

CIE often frames questions as 'Critically compare the view that... with the view that...' or 'Which is more convincing?'. A significant proportion of candidates present a one-sided essay that champions one position while barely engaging with the alternative. This severely limits AO2 marks because evaluation requires demonstrated weighing of competing considerations. The error often stems from a well-intentioned desire to present a decisive conclusion, but philosophy essays thrive on demonstrating that the issue is complex and hard to resolve fully.

CIE 常常将问题设计为“批判性地比较……观点与……观点”或“哪一个更具说服力?”。相当比例的考生会写出一边倒的论文,拥护一种立场却几乎没有触及对立观点。这严重限制了 AO2 分数,因为评估要求展示对不同考虑的权衡。该错误往往出于想给出决定性结论的善意愿望,但哲学论文的亮点恰恰在于展示问题的复杂性和难以彻底解决的特性。

To construct a balanced comparison, allocate roughly equal space to the strongest arguments for each side, then develop an integrative paragraph that explores whether the views can be partly reconciled or whether one has a dialectical advantage. For example, in comparing substance dualism and physicalism, you might argue that physicalism has stronger empirical support and avoids the interaction problem, while dualism better preserves first-person qualitative experience—and that this tension reveals the hard problem of consciousness remains open. Always signal your evaluative criteria explicitly: are you judging by explanatory power, ontological parsimony, or compatibility with science?

要构建平衡的比较,应当将大体相等的篇幅分配给双方的最强论证,然后写一个综合段落,探讨这些观点是否可以部分调和,或者其中一方是否拥有辩证优势。例如,在比较实体二元论和物理主义时,你可以主张物理主义拥有更强的经验支持并避开了互动问题,而二元论更好地保留了第一人称的质性经验——并且这种张力揭示了意识的困难问题仍未解决。永远要明确标示你的评估标准:你是根据解释力、本体论简约性还是与科学的兼容性来评判?


9. Time Management and Question Selection | 时间管理与选题策略

With 90 minutes to write two essays, time pressure magnifies every other mistake. A common tactical error is starting the paper by writing a lengthy, detailed plan for the first question, leaving insufficient time for the second essay, which often ends up as an underdeveloped outline. Candidates also sometimes choose questions based on topic familiarity rather than the specific demand of the question stem. A question that asks 'To what extent does the duplication problem undermine psychological continuity theories?' requires a different approach from 'Outline and evaluate the psychological continuity theory of personal identity.' Judging the command words is critical.

要在 90 分钟内写完两篇论文,时间压力会放大其他所有错误。一个常见的战术性错误是开始答题时花大量时间为第一道题写详细提纲,导致第二篇论文时间不足,常常变成一份发育不全的纲要。考生有时还会根据对话题的熟悉程度而非问题主干的具体要求来选题。一道问“复制问题在多大程度上削弱了心理连续性理论?”的题目,与“概述并评估个人身份的心理连续性理论”要求不同的处理方式。判断指令词至关重要。

Spend the first 5–7 minutes scanning all questions and jotting down 3–4 key points for each option before committing. This prevents the sunk-cost fallacy of sticking with a question you realise later you cannot answer well. During the essay, aim for concise definitions and avoid excessively long introductions. A strong introduction is two or three sentences that clarify how you interpret the question and signpost the argument's direction. If you find yourself running out of time, write the conclusion in note form with key evaluative points—this can still gain some AO2 marks, whereas an unwritten conclusion yields nothing.

用最初 5–7 分钟浏览所有题目,并在决定前为每个选项草记 3–4 个要点。这能避免后来意识到某道题答不好却由于沉没成本谬误而不愿更换。在论文写作过程中,力求定义简洁,避免过长的引言。一个强有力的引言只需两三句话,阐明你如何解读题目并指示论证方向。如果发现时间不够,用笔记形式写下含有关键评估要点的结论——这仍能获得一些 AO2 分数,而未写的结论则一分都无。


10. Understanding AO1 and AO2 Weightings in the Mark Scheme | 理解评分方案中 AO1 与 AO2 的权重

In the AS Philosophy mark scheme, AO1 (knowledge and understanding) accounts for 40% and AO2 (analysis, evaluation, and application) for 60% of the total marks. Despite this, many essays are heavily weighted toward AO1, reproducing textbook summaries of Hume's fork or Locke's prince-and-cobbler case without sustained evaluation. This is the single most common reason why promising students plateau at 15–17 out of 25 rather than reaching the 20+ band. AO2 is not simply stating 'I agree' or 'this is weak'; it involves structured critical reasoning.

在 AS 哲学评分方案中,AO1(知识与理解)占总分的 40%,AO2(分析、评估与应用)占 60%。尽管如此,许多论文却严重偏重于 AO1,复述着教科书上关于休谟叉子或洛克王子和鞋匠案例的摘要,缺乏持续的评估。这是有潜力的学生分数徘徊在 15–17 分(满分 25)而无法进入 20 分以上档次的最常见原因。AO2 不仅仅是陈述“我同意”或“这很弱”;它要求结构化的批判性推理。

To demonstrate AO2 effectively, use phrases that signal evaluation: 'This premise is contestable because...', 'The strength of this reply lies in...', 'However, this response fails to account for...'. Examiners look for a clear evaluative thread running through the essay, not just a final paragraph tagged on at the end. Integrating AO2 means that after explaining an argument (AO1), you immediately probe its assumptions, consider counterexamples, and assess its implications before moving to the next point. Practise writing 'even if...' sentences, which show you can entertain a hypothetical and still defend a position, a hallmark of sophisticated evaluation.

要有效展示 AO2,可使用标示评估的短语:“这个前提是可争议的,因为……”、“这一回应的优势在于……”、“然而,这一回应未能解释……”。考官在寻找一条贯穿全文的清晰评估线索,而不仅仅是在末尾贴上的一段话。融入 AO2 意味着在解释一个论证(AO1)之后,你立即探究其预设、思考反例,并在转向下一点之前评估其含义。练习书写“即使……”的句子,这能展示你可以接纳一个假设性情景而仍然捍卫一种立场,这是成熟评估的标志。


11. Tackling the 'Does the argument succeed?' Question Type | 应对“该论证成功吗?”的题型

Questions that ask whether a specific philosophical argument succeeds appear in every exam series, for instance, 'Does Descartes succeed in establishing that mind and body are distinct?' The predictable error is to launch into a general discussion of dualism without analysing the structure of the argument itself. You must dissect the argument's premises, evaluate whether each is justified, and check whether the conclusion follows. This means distinguishing between soundness and validity: an argument can be valid but unsound if a premise is false, and the question usually demands an assessment of both.

询问特定哲学论证是否成功的题目出现在每一考季,例如“笛卡尔是否成功地确立了心与身不同?”可预见的错误是直接展开对二元论的一般性讨论,却没有分析该论证自身的结构。你必须解剖论证的前提,评估每一前提是否得到辩护,并检查结论是否必然得出。这意味着要区分有效性和可靠性:一个论证可能有效却因前提为假而不可靠,而题目通常要求对两者都做出评估。

For the Conceivability Argument, identify the exact premises: (1) If I can clearly and distinctly perceive X existing without Y, then X can exist without Y. (2) I can clearly and distinctly perceive my mind existing without my body. (3) Therefore, my mind can exist without my body. Now examine premise (1): does conceivability genuinely entail metaphysical possibility? Bring in Arnauld's triangle objection or modern responses about the limits of modal intuition. An essay that simply retells Descartes's meditations without this premise-by-premise scrutiny will not reach the top band. Use this structured approach for any 'Does X's argument succeed?' question across all core themes.

对于可设想性论证,要识别确切的前提:(1) 如果我能清晰分明地感知 X 脱离 Y 而存在,那么 X 就能脱离 Y 而存在。(2) 我能清晰分明地感知自己的心灵脱离身体而存在。(3) 因此,我的心灵能脱离身体而存在。现在检查前提 (1):可设想性是否真正蕴含形而上学的可能性?引入阿尔诺的三角形反驳或关于模态直觉局限性的现代回应。一篇仅仅复述笛卡尔的沉思而不进行这种逐前提审视的论文,无法达到最高档次。在所有核心主题中遇到“某人的论证是否成功?”的问题时,都可采用这种结构化的方法。


12. Using Thought Experiments Correctly and Avoiding Misapplication | 正确使用思想实验并避免误用

Thought experiments like the brain in a vat, Parfit's teletransporter, or Frankfurt's counterexamples are essential tools, but students often treat them as straightforward evidence rather than devices that test conceptual intuitions. A frequent exam mistake is to treat the 'brain in a vat' scenario as a proof of scepticism, when it merely illustrates the logical possibility of error. The philosophical work lies in analysing whether this logical possibility is enough to undermine knowledge claims. Without that analysis, the thought experiment adds descriptive colour but earns no AO2 credit.

缸中之脑、帕菲特的远距传送器或法兰克福的反例等思想实验是必要的工具,但学生常将它们当作直接证据,而非测试概念直觉的装置。一个常见的考试错误是把“缸中之脑”情景当作怀疑论的证明,而它只是说明了错误的逻辑可能性。真正的哲学工作在于分析这一逻辑可能性是否足以摧毁知识主张。若没有该分析,思想实验只增加了描述性色彩而得不到 AO2 分数。

Similarly, in Personal Identity, simply describing the teletransporter and concluding 'therefore personal identity is psychological' misses the nuance. You need to clarify what exactly the thought experiment isolates: it controls for bodily continuity and tests whether our intuitive identification follows the psychological stream. A strong evaluation then asks whether this intuition is universal or culturally specific, and whether branching cases expose a weakness. Always state why the thought experiment matters—what basic assumption it challenges or supports—and never assume the examiner will infer its relevance.

同样地,在个人身份中,仅仅描述远距传送器并得出结论“因此个人身份是心理的”,则丢失了细微处。你需要阐明该思想实验到底在隔离什么:它控制了身体连续性,并测试我们的直觉认同是否跟随心理流。随后,强有力的评估会追问这一直觉是普遍的还是受文化限制的,以及分支案例是否暴露了弱点。永远要陈述该思想实验为何重要——它挑战或支持了什么基本预设——并绝不要认为考官会自动推断其相关性。

Published by TutorHao | Philosophy Revision Series | aleveler.com

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