📚 Year 11 Cambridge Philosophy: Quick Reference to Key Concepts and Arguments | Year 11 剑桥哲学：核心概念与论证速查手册
This is not a science revision guide filled with equations and formulas. Instead, it is a distillation of the 'laws', principles, and logical tools that shape philosophical enquiry. Whether you are analysing the nature of knowledge, the existence of God, or the foundations of morality, these are the mental frameworks you will need. Use this manual to quickly recall the central moves in every major debate.
这不是一本充满方程和公式的科学复习指南。相反，它提炼了塑造哲学探究的“法则”、原理和逻辑工具。无论你是在分析知识的本质、上帝的存在还是道德的基础，你都需要这些思维框架。使用本手册快速回顾每一个重大辩论中的核心论证。
1. The Cogito (I think, therefore I am) | 我思故我在
Descartes’s foundational principle. Even if an evil demon is deceiving him about everything, the very act of doubting proves his existence as a thinking thing. The Cogito is the first indubitable truth in his quest for certain knowledge.
笛卡尔的基础性原则。即使有一个邪恶的恶魔在一切事情上欺骗他，怀疑这一行为本身就证明了他作为一个思维者的存在。“我思故我在”是他寻求确定知识的第一个不容置疑的真理。
- English: 'Cogito, ergo sum' — the act of thought guarantees the thinker's existence.
- 中文：'Cogito, ergo sum'——思考的行为保证了思考者的存在。
- English: It is resistant to radical scepticism but does it prove anything beyond one's own mind?
- 中文：它能抵御激进怀疑论，但它是否证明了超出个人心智之外的任何东西？
2. Hume's Fork (Relations of Ideas vs. Matters of Fact) | 休谟叉（观念关系与事实）
. Matters of fact are a posteriori, contingent, and known through experience. Claiming to know something that fits neither category is 'sophistry and illusion'.
休谟将所有有意义的命题分为两类。观念关系是先天的、必然的，仅通过思考就能知道（如2+2=4）。事实则是后天的、偶然的，通过经验得知。声称知道既不属于前者也不属于后者的事物，就是“诡辩和幻想”。
- English: Use this fork to test any claim. If it is not logically true and not empirically verifiable, commit it to the flames.
- 中文：用这把叉子检验任何主张。如果它既非逻辑真，又非经验可验证，就把它付之一炬。
3. Ockham's Razor (The Principle of Parsimony) | 奥卡姆剃刀（简约原则）
Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. When faced with competing explanations, the one that makes the fewest assumptions is usually preferred. It is a methodological principle, not a proof of truth, but it helps cut away unnecessary metaphysical baggage.
如无必要，勿增实体。面对相互竞争的解释时，通常应选择假设最少的那一个。这是一条方法论原则，不是真理的证明，但有助于剔除不必要的形而上学负担。
- English: A theist might avoid multiplying miracles; a materialist might avoid multiplying mental substances.
- 中文：有神论者可能避免增加奇迹的数量；唯物主义者可能避免增加精神实体。
4. The Tripartite Definition of Knowledge (Justified True Belief) | 知识的三元定义（JTB）
Since Plato, knowledge has often been defined as justified true belief. You must believe a proposition, it must actually be true, and you must have good reasons (justification) for believing it. The JTB account dominated epistemology until Gettier's counterexamples.
自柏拉图以来，知识常被定义为确证的真信念。你必须相信一个命题，它必须为真，并且你必须有好的理由（确证）去相信它。JTB理论一直在认识论中占主导地位，直到盖提尔反例的出现。
- English: S knows that P if and only if (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P, and (iii) S is justified in believing that P.
- 中文：S知道P，当且仅当 (i) P为真，(ii) S相信P，并且 (iii) S有理由相信P。
- English: Gettier cases show that one can have JTB yet still lack knowledge (e.g. lucky coincidence).
- 中文：盖提尔案例表明，一个人可以拥有JTB却仍然缺乏知识（例如幸运的巧合）。
5. The Problem of Evil (The Logical and Evidential Arguments) | 恶的问题（逻辑论证与证据论证）
The problem of evil challenges the coherence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God in a world that contains suffering. The logical version claims that the existence of any evil is logically incompatible with such a God. The evidential version argues that the sheer amount and distribution of pointless suffering makes God's existence unlikely.
恶的问题挑战了在一个充满苦难的世界里，全能、全善的上帝的融贯性。逻辑版本声称，任何恶的存在都与这样一位上帝在逻辑上不相容。证据版本则主张，大量且分布广泛的无意义苦难使得上帝的存在不太可能。
- English: Mackie's inconsistent triad: God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, yet evil exists. At least one must be false.
- 中文：麦基的不一致三元组：上帝全能，上帝全善，然而恶存在。至少有一个必须为假。
6. Theodicies and Defences (Free Will Defence and Soul-Making) | 神正论与辩护（自由意志辩护与灵魂锻造）
A theodicy explains why God allows evil. The Free Will Defence (Plantinga) argues that a world with morally free creatures is more valuable than one without, even if it brings moral evil. Hick's soul-making theodicy sees evil as necessary for spiritual growth, transforming humans into the likeness of God.
神正论解释上帝为何允许恶。自由意志辩护（普兰丁格）认为，拥有道德自由生物的世界比没有的世界更有价值，即使这带来了道德恶。希克的灵魂锻造神正论将恶视为精神成长的必要条件，将人塑造成上帝的模样。
- English: Plantinga's defence aims to show that evil is logically compatible with God's existence, not that it is the actual reason.
- 中文：普兰丁格的辩护旨在表明恶与上帝存在在逻辑上是相容的，而非表明这是实际的原因。
- English: Critics ask whether such suffering is really necessary, especially the suffering of innocents.
- 中文：批评者质疑这种苦难是否真的必要，尤其是无辜者的苦难。
7. The Euthyphro Dilemma | 游叙弗伦困境
Plato's fundamental question about the nature of morality and divinity: Is what is holy holy because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is holy? This dilemma forces theists to choose between arbitrary moral commands and an independent moral standard that seems to limit God.
柏拉图关于道德与神性本质的根本问题：被神所爱是因为它是神圣的，还是因为神爱它，它才神圣？这个困境迫使有神论者在任意的道德命令和一个似乎限制了上帝的独立道德标准之间做出选择。
- English: If commanded because good, then goodness exists apart from God. If good because commanded, then morality is arbitrary and God could command cruelty.
- 中文：如果是因其善而被命令，则善独立于上帝存在。如果是因命令而为善，则道德是任意的，上帝可以命令残忍之事。
8. Kant's Categorical Imperative (The Formula of Universal Law) | 康德的定言命令（普遍法则公式）
Kant’s supreme principle of morality commands us to act only according to that maxim through which we can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. It tests the rationality of an action: if everyone acted on the same rule, would a contradiction arise in conception or in willing?
康德的最高道德原则命令我们：只按照你同时能够愿意它成为一个普遍法则的那个准则去行动。它检验一个行动的合理性：如果每个人都按照同一个规则行事，是否会在设想或意愿中产生矛盾？
- English: Do not make a false promise. If everyone did, the institution of promising would collapse (contradiction in conception).
- 中文：不要做虚假承诺。如果人人都这样做，承诺制度就会崩溃（设想中的矛盾）。
- English: Also act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end, never merely as a means.
- 中文：同时，你要这样行动，永远将你人格中的人性和他人人格中的人性作为目的，而绝不仅仅作为工具。
9. Utilitarianism (The Greatest Happiness Principle) | 功利主义（最大幸福原则）
Bentham and Mill held that the right action is the one that maximises overall happiness or pleasure and minimises pain. It is a consequentialist theory: the ends justify the means. Mill distinguished higher intellectual pleasures from lower bodily pleasures, refining the crude calculus.
边沁和穆勒认为，正确的行为是最大化总体幸福或快乐并最小化痛苦的行为。这是一种后果论理论：目的为手段辩护。穆勒区分了高级的智力快乐和低级的身体快乐，从而改良了粗糙的计算法。
- English: Act utilitarianism evaluates individual acts; rule utilitarianism evaluates rules that, if generally followed, maximise utility.
- 中文：行为功利主义评价单个行为；规则功利主义评价规则，如果普遍遵循这些规则，能最大化功利。
- English: Critics argue it can justify injustice (punishing an innocent for the greater good) and ignores rights.
- 中文：批评者认为，它能为不义（为多数人的利益惩罚无辜者）辩护，并且忽视了权利。
10. Aristotle's Virtue Ethics (The Doctrine of the Mean) | 亚里士多德的德性伦理学（中道学说）
For Aristotle, the good life (eudaimonia) is a life of rational activity in accordance with virtue. Virtues are character states that lie in a mean relative to us, between excess and deficiency. Courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice. Virtue is cultivated through habituation.
对亚里士多德来说，幸福（eudaimonia）是依据德性而进行的理性活动的生活。德性是一种与我们相关的、在过度和不及之间的中道状态。勇敢是鲁莽和怯懦之间的中道。德性通过习惯来培养。
- English: It focuses on the agent's character, not on acts or consequences. 'What sort of person should I be?'
- 中文：它关注的是行为者的品格，而不是行为或后果。“我应该成为什么样的人？”
11. The Design Argument (Teleological Argument) | 设计论证（目的论论证）
The universe exhibits order and complexity that seem directed towards an end, like a watch implies a watchmaker (Paley). Swinburne updated this with probability: a world that contains order-producing beings (humans) is more likely if there is a God. Hume anticipated many objections: the world is more like a vegetable than a machine; multiple gods; a flawed design.
宇宙展现出指向某个目的的有序性和复杂性，就像手表意味着钟表匠一样（佩利）。斯温伯恩用概率更新了论证：如果存在上帝，一个含有能产生秩序的存在者（人类）的世界就更有可能。休谟预设了许多反对意见：世界更像蔬菜而非机器；多神；有缺陷的设计。
- English: The argument is analogical and inductive. The conclusion never has certainty but can, proponents say, be the best explanation.
- 中文：这个论证是类比的和归纳的。结论从无确定性，但支持者说，它可以是最佳解释。
12. The Cosmological Argument (First Cause and Contingency) | 宇宙论论证（第一因与偶然性）
Aquinas’s First Way argues from motion: everything in motion is moved by something else, and this chain cannot regress infinitely; there must be a first unmoved mover. The contingency argument (Leibniz, Craig) asks why there is something rather than nothing; contingent beings require a necessary being to explain their existence.
阿奎那的第一路从运动论证：任何运动之物都为他物所推动，这个链条不能无限回溯；必有一个第一不动的推动者。偶然性论证（莱布尼茨、克雷格）问为何存在有而非无；偶然存在者需要一个必然存在者来解释其存在。
- English: The Principle of Sufficient Reason: everything must have a reason or cause. If the universe began to exist (Big Bang), it seems to need a cause outside itself.
- 中文：充足理由律：任何事物都必须有一个理由或原因。如果宇宙开始存在（大爆炸），它似乎需要一个自身之外的原因。
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